


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Arms Control

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Arms Control

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CONTENTS

22 May 1992

CHINA

Article on Destruction of Nuclear Weapons [Liu Huaqiu; SHIJIE ZHISHI 1 Apr]	1
Central Military Commission Plan for Disarmament [Hong Kong CHING CHI JIH PAO 2 May]	2
Reportage Views International Mideast Peace Talks	3
Talks Begin [XINHUA 11 May]	3
Beijing Seeks 'Fair' Arms Control [XINHUA 12 May]	3
Delegate Gives Middle East Arms Control Stance [H. Dalong; XINHUA 12 May]	4

EAST ASIA

SOUTH KOREA

President No Tae-u Urges N-S Mutual Arms Reduction [YONHAP 12 May]	5
--	---

EAST EUROPE

POLAND

Russian Combat Troops To Withdraw By 15 Nov	6
Russian Commander Cited [PAP 8 May]	6
To Leave Jelenia Gora by August [PAP 9 May]	6

NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Palestinian Disarmament, Security Principles Listed [AL-SHA'B 12 May]	7
---	---

INDIA

Mideast Stance Said Aimed at Arms Control [F. Khergamvala; THE HINDU 16 Apr]	7
--	---

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

GENERAL

'Realistic' Moves for Reducing Arsenals Viewed [G. Novikov; NOVOYE VREMYA No 15, Apr] ...	9
Participants Review Nuclear Arms Conference [Tallinn Radio 26 Apr]	9
GRU Chief on Arms Control Verification Role [Ye. Timokhin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 29 Apr] ...	10

START TALKS

Russian Spokesman on Other Nuclear Republics	10
'Unaware' of START Role [ITAR-TASS 30 Apr]	10
Urges Nonproliferation Adherence [INTERFAX 30 Apr]	11
Kozyrev, Baker Discuss START Implementation [ITAR-TASS 3 May]	11

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

ABM Treaty Considered Barrier to Joint SDI [B. Tuzmukhamedov; IZVESTIYA 24 Apr]	11
Azerbaijan Radar Station Closing Debated [INTERFAX 2 May]	12

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Reports on Latvian-Russian Troop Withdrawal Talks	13
New Timetable Proposed [Riga International 27 Apr]	13
Experts Begin Talks [Riga Radio 28 Apr]	13
Ambassador to UN Protests [Riga Radio 3 May]	13
Russian Spokesman Raps Latvian Envoy's Statements [ITAR-TASS 5 May]	13
Baltic Delegations Discuss Russian Withdrawal [Riga Radio 29 Apr]	14
Further on Lithuanian Calls for Russian Troop Pullout	14
Withdrawal Referendum Resolution [Vilnius Radio 1 May]	14
Delegate Comments [A. Bishala; Russian TV 1 May]	14
Russian Official Confirms Timetable [BALTFAX 4 May]	14
Problems of Troop Withdrawal From Germany Viewed	15
Official on Financial, Housing Problems [A. Temerko; ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 5 May] ...	15
Legislators, German Military Meet [ITAR-TASS 5 May]	16
Reports on Russian Troop Withdrawal From Estonia	16
Russian Envoy, Estonian Chairman Confer [BALTFAX 6 May]	16
Envoy Comments [BALTFAX 6 May]	17
Russian Submarine Crews Preparing To Depart [BALTFAX 6 May]	17
Kazakhstan Ready for Conventional Arms Cuts [INTERFAX 7 May]	17

NUCLEAR TESTING

Pollution Measured After Arctic Bomb Tests [L. Obukhova, V. Galnykin; Moscow TV 1 May]	17
Krasnoyarsk Checks Nuclear Tests' Claims [INTERFAX 3 May]	18
Nuclear Minister Meets Swedish Official [ITAR-TASS 4 May]	18
Kazakh Deputy Premier on Effects of Testing [O. Soskovets; Vienna Radio 6 May]	18

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR BW Program, Treaty Violations Viewed [V. Umnov; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 30 Apr]	19
'No Proven Technology' for Chemical Disposal [I. Deryugin; Russian TV 1 May]	20
Committee To Implement CW Destruction Accord [A. Kuntsevich; Moscow International 2 May]	21
CIS Spokesman Says No Chemical Weapons in Karabakh [ITAR-TASS 6 May]	21
Armenia Requests Removal of Chemical Weapons [Moscow TV 6 May]	21

NUCLEAR FREE ZONES & PEACE ZONES

Ukraine Advocates 'Nuclear-Free' Black Sea [S. Feoktistov; ITAR-TASS 5 May]	21
---	----

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Absence of Nuclear Arms at Estonian Base Confirmed [BALTFAX 27 Apr]	22
Ukraine Links Denuclearization, Security Guarantees [Kiev International 27 Apr]	22
Ukraine, Kazakhstan Said To 'Privatize' Arsenals	22
Arms Control Expert Interviewed [A. Savelyev; IZVESTIYA 30 Apr]	22
Ukraine Denies Charge [Kiev International 1 May]	23
Ukraine's Denuclearization Offer Viewed [M. Shchipanov; KURANTY 30 Apr]	23
Kazakh President to Japanese on Nuclear Policy	24
To Keep Arms 15 Years [N. Nazarbayev; Tokyo TV 1 May]	24
Meets With Japanese Foreign Minister [ITAR-TASS 2 May]	24
Discuss Nonproliferation Treaty [Tokyo KYODO 2 May]	24
Further on Nuclear Proliferation [Tokyo TV 2 May]	24
Byelarus Loses No Prestige Over Weapons Removal [INTERFAX 4 May]	25
U.S. 'Pressure' on Republics To Drop Nuclear Status Eyed [V. Mikheyev; IZVESTIYA 5 May] ...	25
Further on Ukraine, Byelarus Nuclear Transfer	26
Ukraine Removes 'Last' of Tactical Arms [INTERFAX 6 May]	26
Official 'Cannot Confirm' Report [Russian TV 6 May]	26
CIS, Ukrainian Aides Comment [Moscow Radio 6 May]	26

Munitions Described [IZVESTIYA 7 May]	27
Byelarus Status Reaffirmed [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 6 May]	28
'Distortion' by Moscow Alleged [Kiev International 7 May]	28
Ukraine Defense Reports Withdrawal [Kiev Radio 6 May]	28
'Contradictions' on Ukraine Withdrawal [V. Litovkin; IZVESTIYA 8 May]	29
Ukraine, CIS Blame Each Other [M. Shevtsov; ITAR-TASS 8 May]	29
Kravchuk 'Did Not Know Everything' [K. Belyaninov; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 8 May]	30
Ukraine's Kravchuk Visits Washington	30
Discusses START With Bush [ITAR-TASS 6 May]	30
Holds News Conference [ITAR-TASS 6 May]	30
U.S. Concerns Viewed [A. Shalnev; IZVESTIYA 7 May]	31
Visit Allays U.S. Nuclear Concerns [A. Shalnev; IZVESTIYA 8 May]	32
Reaffirms Nuclear Weapons Policy [V. Demidenko, I Barsukov; ITAR-TASS 7 May]	32
Kravchuk on Black Sea, START Treaty [Y. Kirilchenko; ITAR-TASS 8 May]	33
Kozyrev Assures Germans on Nuclear Weapons	33
'Main Concern' for Germany [ITAR-TASS 7 May]	33
Further Report [Berlin ADN 7 May]	33

WEST EUROPE

FINLAND

Premier 'Concerned' Over Russian Troop Buildup [Stockholm Radio 5 May]	35
--	----

FRANCE

Chief of Staff Cited on Nuclear Test Suspension [LE MONDE 22 Apr]	35
Regional Impact of Military Restructuring Viewed	35
Lorient Naval Base [M. Le Hebel; LE MONDE 26-27 Apr]	35
Alsace Affected [M. Scotto; LE MONDE 26-27 Apr]	36
Strasbourg Air Base [J. Fortier; LE MONDE 26-27 Apr]	37
Reaction at Cherbourg [LE MONDE 26-27 Apr]	37
Picardy Studied [LE MONDE 26-27 Apr]	38

GERMANY

Impact of Canadian Force Withdrawal Assessed [K. Feldmayer; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 18 Apr]	38
Bundeswehr To Dismantle Weapons Systems [DPA 2 May]	39

Article on Destruction of Nuclear Weapons

HK0505050092 Beijing SHIJIE ZHISHI in Chinese
No 7, 1 Apr 92 p 12

[Article by Liu Huaqiu (0491 5478 4428) and Suo Kaiming (6956 7030 2494): "How Should Nuclear Weapons be Destroyed?"]

[Text] A new nuclear disarmament plan was presented by U.S. President George Bush on 28 January this year, wherein he proposed that the United States and the CIS cut their strategic nuclear warheads from 4,500 to 5,000. The next day President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation responded immediately by suggesting that the two sides should reduce their nuclear warheads further to 2,500. The destruction of nuclear weapons, notably that of nuclear warheads, is now on the agenda. However, of great concern to the people is the fact that despite the many agreements reached between the United States and the Soviet Union since 1987 about the destruction of nuclear weapons, not a single nuclear weapon has been genuinely destroyed by either the United States or the Soviet Union (now the CIS). In truth, genuine efforts to destroy nuclear weapons not only require political sincerity but also involve a certain degree of technical difficulty.

Which parts to eliminate Broadly speaking, so-called nuclear weapons are made up of nuclear warheads, which possess destructive and fatal effects, and the vehicles used to transport them. In a narrower sense, nuclear weapons refer to the nuclear warheads themselves. The reduction and destruction of nuclear weapons under negotiation by the United States and the Soviet Union have different definitions on different occasions.

The agreement on intermediate range missiles provides for the destruction of all intermediate range and intermediate to short-range missiles in the arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union, but what was to be destroyed was merely the delivery systems and the launchers. The nuclear warheads installed on the missiles and the guiding systems were to be dismantled but not destroyed.

Meanwhile, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty only laid down the maximum amount of strategic weapons which the United States and the Soviet Union were entitled to keep, with the surplus to be either revamped or destroyed. Those designated for destruction referred only to the delivery systems of the strategic weapons which are over the quota and did not include the nuclear warheads. Even the delivery systems which were over the quota would not be entirely destroyed, with some missiles still to be used in space launch experiments.

It was only last year, when the United States and the Soviet Union both announced the dismantling of a greater part of their tactical nuclear weapons, that the destruction of nuclear warheads was explicitly stated for the first time. But this did not include all launchers

because they could be used normally for both nuclear and conventional weapons. However, even the nuclear warheads included in this destruction plan were not subject to total elimination but to alteration or dismantling. U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney said: The dismantled warheads will be reentered into the arsenal and may be used to manufacture even more advanced warheads. Just like the Pershing II intermediate range missiles destroyed by the United States: Its nuclear warhead W-85 was refitted into the B-61-10 nuclear bomb and the nuclear explosives and some spare parts in the warheads could be used to manufacture new warheads.

Difficulty in destruction of nuclear warheads Why are the United States and the Soviet Union (especially the United States) reluctant about destroying nuclear warheads? 1) Huge costs and highly-demanding technical skills. As in its manufacture, the destruction of a nuclear weapon requires the building of appropriate facilities and the development of a series of appropriate technologies. Some people estimate that the destruction of nuclear warheads could cost more than their production. 2) The destruction of nuclear warheads involves the risk of revealing nuclear secrets because nuclear warhead technology is the most confidential secret of a state. The process of destroying a nuclear warhead will require on-the-spot supervision by personnel from the other side in order to ensure genuine destruction of the warheads. In so doing, it is possible that the nuclear warhead secrets would be stolen by the other side.

How to destroy nuclear warheads To destroy a nuclear warhead, it is necessary, first of all, to separate the high-capacity explosives, which trigger the nuclear explosives, from the pyrotechnical system and the nuclear explosives and then to convert the nuclear explosives into nuclear material which can no longer be used directly to manufacture nuclear warheads. Nuclear explosives are classified into two types: 1) Fission material, including weapons-grade uranium and plutonium; and 2) Fusion material, including deuterium, tritium, and lithium. Most of these nuclear explosives are radioactive and some even have immense chemical toxic effect. Consequently, it is necessary to build different facilities and adopt different techniques in disposing of the nuclear explosives in accordance with their unique features. The most crucial, and most difficult part of destroying nuclear weapons is the destruction of the fission material.

Some tentative ideas Recently, some experts and scholars have presented all kinds of tentative ideas on how to destroy nuclear material, the principal ones being as follows:

1. Long-term storage in a mixed form. Plutonium recovered from dismantled warheads is to be mixed with highly-radioactive waste and the combined product stored indefinitely. The contaminated plutonium is highly unlikely to be used again to manufacture new weapons because the removal of the radioactive waste

from the combined product would be too costly in terms of money and time. This method is simpler but indefinite storage constitutes a waste of resources.

2. Use in military domain not involving weapons. Uranium and plutonium could be used for military purposes but not involving weapons, that is, mainly as the fuel for reactor propulsion systems in submarines, ships, or space satellites. The problem is that since these submarines and military fleets could carry nuclear weapons, it will be difficult to ensure that this plutonium and uranium are not used to manufacture nuclear weapons.

3. As nuclear fuel for nonmilitary purposes. Recovered highly enriched uranium can be used directly in certain special civilian-use reactor propulsion systems; natural uranium can also be diluted and converted into low-enriched uranium, to be used in ordinary nuclear power stations. Recovered plutonium can be used as supplementary nuclear fuel for conventional power reactors as well as nuclear fuel for breeder reactors. The advantage of this method is to convert the nuclear explosives in the weapons to peaceful uses. But the use of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium as nuclear fuel for civilian purposes will also increase the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation and nuclear terror.

4. Disposal into the atmosphere. The recovered plutonium could be rocketed into outer space, dispersed in the ocean, or buried deep at sea or in caves. The advantage of this is that no one will have easy and fast access to these materials. However, the problem is that this will also provoke strong protests from global environmental protection organizations and expose the entire human race to the danger of plutonium radiation.

As for fusion nuclear material, its disposal is simpler. Because they are stable elements, deuterium and lithium can be stored indefinitely and will disappear after their natural disintegration over a long period of time.

Currently, some nuclear experts from the United States and the CIS are carrying on with their study of better ways to destroy nuclear warheads because these are vital parts of nuclear weapons. Unless they are destroyed, there cannot be a thorough nuclear disarmament.

Central Military Commission Plan for Disarmament

*HK0205042192 Hong Kong CHING CHI JIH PAO
in Chinese 2 May 92 p 3*

[By special correspondent Chang Hua (1728 5478): "CPC Calls on Military To Support Reform, Conducts Positive Education Instead of Launching Activities To Eliminate 'Left' Tendencies"]

[Text] According to a military source in Beijing, the enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission, which ended last weekend, decided to serve as an "escort" to reform and opening up but not to launch

activities to eliminate "left" tendencies in the army. The meeting also formulated a new disarmament proposal.

The enlarged meeting, which was the first top-level army meeting against the background of Deng Xiaoping's comments during his southern tour and further promotion of reform and opening up, was presided over by Yang Baibing, secretary general of the Central Military Commission. Jiang Zemin, chairman of the Central Military Commission and general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, spoke at the meeting. Persons in charge of the General Staff Department, General Political Department, General Logistics Department, as well as all arms and services and all military regions, attended the meeting.

According to the source, the meeting set forth three requirements for implementing the remarks Deng made during his southern tour. 1) Firmly support reform and opening up by serving as an "escort" to this process; 2) learn the reform spirit from the localities and promote military work with this spirit; and, 3) comprehensively and accurately comprehend the spirit of Deng Xiaoping's comment that "we must be alert for right tendencies, but mainly we must guard against 'left' tendencies," persist in conducting education within the army primarily by offering positive examples, and refrain from launching activities to eliminate "left" tendencies.

The source pointed out that the main purpose of the enlarged meeting deciding not to launch activities to eliminate "left" tendencies is to protect the army's image and avoid, as a result of eliminating "left" tendencies, obliterating the army's contribution in defending the republic during the 4 June incident.

Moreover, the source revealed that the meeting also worked out a new disarmament proposal. It decided to abolish three field armies and turn the military units into the Armed Police Force and units of provincial military districts; to abolish about 20 military academies and schools, including some army schools for junior officers and technical institutes and schools; to merge the four military departments under the General Staff Department, i.e., the Armored Forces Department, Antichemical Forces Department, Artillery Department, and Engineering Corps Department, into a Special Arms Department; and to preserve the Jinan Military Area, which was originally scheduled to be abolished.

The meeting decided that the guiding principle of disarmament is to have the best armed forces that China's conditions permit and to enhance combat effectiveness.

The source also disclosed that the most difficult problem facing the present troop reduction is the placement of demobilized officers.

Given that local party and government organs are over-staffed and that local enterprises are discarding the "iron rice bowls," it is hard to find posts and wage grades corresponding to those of the demobilized officers.

Reportage Views International Mideast Peace Talks

Talks Begin

OW1205002692 Beijing XINHUA in English
2338 GMT 11 May 92

[Text] Washington, May 11 (XINHUA)—The delegates from 21 nations, including 13 from the Middle East, and the European Community started their multilateral talks today on arms control and regional security in the Middle East.

While entering the U.S. State Department for the talks, David Ivry, director of the Israel's Defense Ministry and head of its delegation, said, "This is the first meeting after the very successful conference, which we had in Moscow, and this is the first phase of a learning process."

"We hope very much that this is going to contribute quite a lot toward the confidence building in the Middle East between Israel and our neighbors," Ivry said.

U.S. officials said the first obstacle was to set an agenda on which all sides can agree. The Arabs have indicated in preliminary discussions that they want to focus on nuclear weapons, because Israel is believed to be the only nuclear power in the region.

But the Israelis preferred to talk about limiting the spread of conventional weapons, because they buy far fewer of those than some of the Arab states.

Egypt is expected to propose a conventional arms freeze as the first step, and has already called for making the Middle East nuclear-free.

But specific steps to freeze or lower arms sales to the region are far off. The volatile Middle East is one of the most heavily armed regions of the world and one of the most important to U.S. interests.

Any hope of braking the flow of weapons to the region depends on the main event in the regional peace process, which began last October in Madrid to start direct bilateral Arab-Israeli talks and the multilateral talks in Moscow last January on such regional issues as arms control, refugees, economic development, water resources and environment.

The United States, the host of the "working group" meeting, is the biggest seller to the region. In the 19 months since Iraq invaded Kuwait, according to figures compiled by the Private Arms Control Association, the United States sold 21.4 billion dollars in weapons to the Middle East, roughly 8.5 billion dollars of which went there after U.S. President George Bush called a year ago for restraint in weapons sales to the region.

Today's session is "an integral part" of the Middle East peace negotiations process, U.S. State Department deputy spokesman Richard Boucher said.

The meeting would conduct in "a seminar format," he said [sentence as received]. "There will be presentations and discussions on the methods and concept of arms control, the evolution of confidence in the security building process, the history of U.S.-Soviet hotline agreements, the incidents at sea and the dangerous military activities agreements."

Later this week, Boucher said, the participants will visit the U.S. State Department's Nuclear Risk Reduction Center and the Defense Department's On-Site Inspection Agency.

Building on arms control experience with the former Soviet Union, U.S. officials hoped to interest the parties in eventually accepting confidence building measures as a first step toward reducing military tensions.

One example likely to be explored is the creation of "hot-line"—the type Moscow and Washington have—so Israel and the Arabs can contact each other in a crisis and prevent an uncontrolled or accidental breakout of hostilities.

Another proposal calls for the Arabs and Israelis to notify each other of planned military maneuvers and planned arms purchases.

But Syria and Lebanon, which boycotted the meeting, have said that they see no point in such discussions until direct discussion with Israel show progress.

Israeli delegates boycotted the economic development meeting today in Brussels and will boycott the refugees talks in Ottawa from Wednesday through Friday, because Palestinians from outside the occupied territories are included in delegations.

Jerusalem objects to such participation because it raises issues of Palestinians' right to return to the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Beijing Seeks 'Fair' Arms Control

OW1205061592 Beijing XINHUA in English
0551 GMT 12 May 92

[Text] Washington, May 11 (XINHUA)—China told a Middle East security conference Monday that arms control in the region should be conducted in a fair and reasonable manner.

The official, Sha Zukang, was in Washington as Chinese delegation head for the working group on arms control and regional security in the Middle East.

Delegates from 21 nations, including 13 Middle East countries, the European Community and the European Free Trade Association were present at today's opening session.

But Syria and Lebanon boycotted the meeting, citing scant progress in Arab-Israeli peace talks.

Sha said arms control was an integral part of the Middle East peace process.

"China deems it necessary to exercise arms control in the region so as to achieve stability at a lower armament level," he said.

"Arms control in the Middle East region should be pursued in a fair, reasonable, comprehensive and balanced manner."

The term comprehensive implied that all types of weapons and all countries be subjected to controls, he said.

Balanced meant the existing regional equilibrium should be maintained and original imbalances not further aggravated, he added.

"China supports the establishment in the Middle East of a nuclear-free-zone and a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction," he said.

Sha urged countries in the region to remove such weapons from their arsenals, destroy research facilities, halt the development and production of such weapons and place nuclear installations under international safeguards.

Countries outside the region should stop exporting such weapons as well as any technologies and parts exclusively used for their research, development and manufacture, he said.

They should also agree never to use such weapons in the Middle East arena, he added.

Delegate Gives Middle East Arms Control Stance

*OW1205131792 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service
in Chinese 0932 GMT 12 May 92*

[By reporter He Dalong (0149 1129 7127)]

[Text] Washington, 11 May (XINHUA)—A group meeting of the Middle East multilateral talks on arms control and regional security was held here today (11 May). In his speech, the Chinese delegate stressed that arms control in the Middle East should be conducted in accordance with fair, reasonable, comprehensive, and balanced principles.

The group meeting is part of the five working groups of the Middle East multilateral talks. Delegates from 21 nations, including 13 Middle East countries, the European Community, and the European Free Trade Association were present at today's session, but Syria and Lebanon did not send their delegates to the session. As a participant in the multilateral talks, China sent delegates to attend the session.

Today's session was presided over by the United States and Russia—conveners of the Middle East peace conference. Speaking at the session, Chinese delegate Sha Zukang pointed out: The Chinese Government attaches great importance to this session and holds that arms control in the Middle East is an important, integral part of the Middle East peace process. To bring about peace and tranquility in the Middle East, China deems it necessary to exercise arms control in the region so as to achieve stability at a lower armament level. This certainly requires the joint efforts of countries in the region and outside the region. Arms control, however, should be conducted mainly by countries within the region in accordance with their national conditions. Countries outside the region, including China, should play an active role in promoting it.

Sha Zukang then explained the Chinese Government's position regarding the principle that arms control in the Middle East should be pursued in a fair, reasonable, comprehensive, and balanced manner. He said: The term "comprehensive" means that all types of weapons and all countries should be subjected to controls. It is not appropriate to restrict only certain weapons without restricting other weapons with similar or even greater offensive capabilities. All countries in the Middle East should be treated equally to prevent the pursuance of double standards. The term "balanced" means the existing regional equilibrium should be maintained and original imbalances not further aggravated. He added: There is inequilibrium in present Middle East armament conditions. Some countries have biological and chemical weapons and high-tech conventional weapons; they even have nuclear weapons or are in the process of developing them. On the other hand, the armaments of some countries are weak. In the process of realizing disarmament and arms control in the Middle East, it is necessary to avoid aggravating its inequilibrium and instability, and its existing inequilibrium must be corrected.

Delegate Sha Zukang also pointed out: The Chinese Government supports the establishment in the Middle East of a nuclear-free zone and a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction. Countries in the region should destroy these types of weapons as well as their research and production facilities and place their nuclear installations under international safeguards. Countries outside the region should promise not to export such weapons as well as any technology and parts exclusively used for their research, development, and manufacture to the Middle East. At the same time, countries possessing weapons of mass destruction outside the region should also promise not to use or deploy these types of weapons in the Middle East region.

The Chinese delegate's speech was warmly welcomed by the participants at the session.

SOUTH KOREA

President No Tae-u Urges N-S Mutual Arms Reduction

*SK1205040792 Seoul YONHAP in English
0305 GMT 12 May 92*

[Text] Seoul, May 12 (YONHAP)—President No Tae-u said Tuesday that South and North Korea should effect mutual arms reduction and nuclear inspections at an early date based on the principle of reciprocity.

"The South and the North should hasten to prepare measures to end their state of meaningless military confrontation," No said.

The president made the remarks in an address read for him by Prime Minister Chong Won-sik at a Seoul regional meeting of the Advisory Council on Democracy and Peaceful Unification held at the Sejong Cultural Center.

He said the implementation of the basic South-North Korean agreement should begin with mutual recognition of each other's entities.

"The two sides should desist from committing any acts that run counter to the pledge made in the agreement," No said.

He also said the two sides should lay bare the state of their armed forces, adopt an information exchange system to forestall inadvertent armed clashes, and reduce their excessive arms based on the principles of reciprocity and rational sufficiency.

Deputy Prime Minister and National Unification Minister Choe Ho-chung reported that the recent inter-Korean agreement on exchanges of aged people was a highly significant feat resulting from the South's consistent efforts.

"We will steadily promote these programs so as to realize free hometown visits and ultimate reunions among dispersed families," Choe said.

Regional meetings of the Advisory Council are to be held in major cities and provincial capitals through May 30.

POLAND**Russian Combat Troops To Withdraw By 15 Nov****Russian Commander Cited**

LD0905182892 Warsaw PAP in English
1712 GMT 8 May 92

[Text] Legnica, May 8—The commander of the the Russian Northern Army Group, General Victor Dubynin told the provincial governor of Legnica in south west Poland that all combat troops would leave Poland by November 15 this year, according to the Governors Plenipotentiary for Cooperation with Abroad, Antoni Golab.

After that date there will still be 6,000 Russian soldiers in Poland, 1,300-1,500 of them in the Legnica area. They will be stationed there to guarantee the safe transit of Russian troops from Germany.

They will also be responsible for calculating, together with the Polish side, the amount owed by the Russians both for the property they have occupied and any ecological damage they have caused.

To Leave Jelenia Gora by August

LD0905183892 Warsaw PAP in English
1523 GMT 9 May 92

[Text] Jelenia Gora, May 9—All units of the former Soviet Army will leave the south-western towns of Swietoszow and Straszow in the Jelenia Gora province by the end of next August. A staff of up to sixty persons will stay to take care of the Army barracks, according to plenipotentiary of the governor of this province for foreign cooperation Bronislaw Kaczmar.

At present the Russians are dismantling all installations, willing to take with themselves as much as possible. The buildings that the Polish side is going to take over are quite devastated.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Palestinian Disarmament, Security Principles Listed

TA1205185892 Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic
12 May 92 pp 1, 11

[Text] Washington—The Palestinian delegation released a statement yesterday in Washington relating to the multilateral working group dealing with disarmament and security in the Middle East.

The principles of the Palestinian position are:

1. The State of Palestine wants to become a peace-loving state in the family of nations.
2. The Palestinian people support any measures that ensure the security and stability of all the Middle Eastern states, including Palestine and Israel.
3. The Palestinian people support the creation of a Middle East free from nuclear weapons, and urge international monitoring and supervision for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone. We call on all states of the Middle East to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
4. The Palestinian people call for the removal of all weapons of mass destruction from the Middle East.
5. The Palestinian people call for a committed, mutual, and balanced halt to weapons production in the Middle East.
6. The Palestinian people support arms reduction and a decrease in military expenditures in the Middle East. They call for an end to the arms race in the region, and they urge foreign suppliers to exercise restraint.
7. The Palestinian people support an active UN role in monitoring affairs relating to the Middle East.
8. The independence of the State of Palestine is the key to ending the conflict with Israel and establishing peace and security for the two peoples.
9. The State of Palestine will maintain military forces for defensive purposes only. It will promote any bilateral or regional measure aimed at preserving the right of all the region's states and peoples to live in peace and security, free from fear.
10. The Palestinian people believe that all security measures in the Middle East must include the two indispensable principles, mutuality and reciprocity, while acknowledging the special conditions and possibilities between states.

INDIA

Mideast Stance Said Aimed at Arms Control

92WC0047A Madras THE HINDU in English
16 Apr 92 p 1

[Article by F.J. Khargamvala: "India Bid To Wriggle Out of N-Dilemma"; boldface words as published]

[Text] By applying to participate in the West Asia peace process, India is trying to explore an exit from the dilemma the Government finds itself in on the nuclear issue. It is a fallback option with little guarantee of success and is totally linked to a successful culmination of the complex peace process.

A few weeks ago India formally wrote to the two cosponsors, the United States and Russia, indicating a desire to participate in three sub-groups of the second phase (multilateral aspects) of the peace talks. They are the sub groups on water sharing, environment and arms control (incorporating related security aspects inclusive of conventional weapons and means of mass destruction). The other sub groups, on refugees and economic cooperation, are of peripheral interest to New Delhi. The second round of the multilateral stage is tentatively scheduled to be held from May 11 to 16 in various capitals.

Initially, when India entered into diplomatic relations with Israel on January 29 this year the political leadership explained the step as being intended to help Palestinians. Observers know this justification is weak and is primarily to address criticism within the Congress(I).

More to the point was the Foreign Secretary, Mr. J.N. Dixit's remark that the decision was taken after considering all aspects of the country's policy. Senior Indian officials say the water sharing aspect would be educative to India in the context of its problems with Bangladesh. So far India has adhered to the bilateral approach with its neighbour. "We are interested in studying firsthand how the extremely complex water sharing problems in West Asia are tackled on a tripartite or quadripartite forum," remarked one official.

Of far greater interest is the arms control aspect. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union with the resultant nuclear weapons-related debate concerning some Central Asian republics, Israel's known yet undeclared weapons capability, the suspected weapons development programme of Iran and Baghdad's clear attempts at a military programme have given India the pretext to wriggle out of the current predicament.

Regional solution: The idea of including Israel, Iran, Iraq and a few former Soviet republics in the nonproliferation ambit is not new because it has been discussed for over a month. What is of significance is that the multilateral West Asia talks give India a structured diplomatic forum to plead its case. Essentially the purpose is to redefine the

concept of a "regional solution" by expanding its geographical scope and, to shrink the geographical definition of the "global disarmament" approach advocated by India without much success.

Moreover, it is possible that once the multilaterals (arms control) take off, the Indian idea would deflect some valid criticism about bankruptcy of flexible counter proposals in response to Pakistan's diplomatic initiatives. A suspected Iranian weapons programme would ordinarily worry India but in the short term it does bolster New Delhi's argument for expanding the "regional" debate.

The new Indian approach, more appropriately a hope, is surely not the only exit avenue being mooted. There are far too many imponderables in it, notably Israel will have to insist on Pakistan being brought into the West Asian disarmament orbit. Furthermore, the arms control aspect will be the final stage to be reached perhaps in five to six years, at optimistic estimates if at all other trade-offs at the direct peace talks succeed. If the Indian idea is accepted and the talks drag on, it will serve New Delhi's interest.

It is by now accepted that the United States is being realistic not pushing India to sign and ratify the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as it stands textually, till 1995. Similarly the five nation (bandicoot?) approach may be intended by the Bush administration only to demonstrate purpose to the U.S. Congress. Doubtless, New Delhi is being pressed to enter some form of regime, by whatever name. If New Delhi can enter the new West Asian idea and insulate itself from U.S. heat till 1995, a solution acceptable to all could be found.

There might be a cross convergence of interest between India and Israel. Last year Israel publicly said it wanted Islamabad's nuclear programme covered by the peace process. So far the United States has rejected the idea of expanding the forum but the important thing is that since the end of last year the Indian foreign office has shed its lethargy and complacency. If it is to pursue its idea seriously, Israel will have to be closely consulted. Equally important, not just disarmament, but water sharing and environment are highly specialised subjects well outside the daily workload of Indian diplomats. A mix of diplomats, regional specialists from the academia and the military must be brought fully into the process.

GENERAL

'Realistic' Moves for Reducing Arsenals Viewed

LD0605093792 Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA
in Russian No 15, Apr 92 (Signed to Press 7 Apr 92) p 37

["Dissenting Opinion" article by Candidate of Technical Sciences Gennadiy Novikov, chief of the RSFSR Ministry of Atomic Energy Sectoral Special Safety Laboratory: "We Say Zero, But What Are We Thinking?"]

[Text] A world without nuclear weapons, and ideally without weapons altogether, is one of the fascinating ideas about a bright future for mankind that prove to be utopian when you try to implement them.

Implements and means of labor that can be used as weapons at a moment's notice will always exist in the world—a stick of dynamite needed to crush rock, hail guns, or engineer Garin's modern hyperboloid.

Be that as it may, time after time Soviet and then Russian leaders have announced considerable reductions in nuclear arsenals. However, it may prove not a lot easier to reduce them than it was to build them up.

Judging by newspaper articles, the nuclear arsenal inherited from the USSR contains 30,000 nuclear munitions. The figure 35,000 has been bandied about of late. Mikhail Gorbachev proposed reducing this whole arsenal to 5,000 warheads. Boris Yeltsin went even further by announcing a severalfold reduction in strategic offensive arms—down to 2,000-2,500 weapons. Is this realistic?

First of all let us try to assess the existing production capacities for dismantlement. There are no official figures, but it is not difficult to make the calculation. If the arsenal consists of 30,000 nuclear munitions with a lifetime of 10-15 years, each year you have to dismantle 2,000-3,000 munitions in order to renew the arsenal and to produce the same number of new ones, of course. So that is the sector's potential.

Thus if we dismantle 5,000 nuclear munitions a year, it will take at least six years to dismantle 30,000. Moreover, we will run up against new difficulties in dismantling weapons on a massive scale. For instance, if 2,500 nuclear munitions are dismantled each year and the same number are produced, clearly some of the components and materials of the dismantled warheads are destroyed, and some are reprocessed and used to produce new warheads (primarily the fissionable material—uranium and plutonium).

If the number of dismantled munitions doubles and the number of new munitions produced decreases almost to zero, then the number of components to be destroyed doubles. That is, the recycling of fissionable materials is interrupted. The problem of utilizing [utilizatsiya] them, particularly the radiobiologically dangerous plutonium,

arises. This may require the creation of an entire sub-sector to destroy and utilize these materials.

There is also another problem—transporting the nuclear weapons for dismantlement. The task is to transport 5,000 munitions each year from military bases to industrial enterprises. Given an average load (50 nuclear munitions per train), 100 trains a year will be required. Each train will be en route for between three and five days. The result is that each day throughout the year there will be several trains carrying nuclear munitions on the railroads. Given our accident rate, that is certainly not a delightful prospect.

The hasty evacuation of nuclear weapons from bases in the CIS independent states and their concentration at Russia's existing bases also increase the risk. Russia's old "powder kegs" will be overfilled and at the same time there will be an increase in the capacity of these potential environmental landmines. I might add that the Russian bases already need reconstruction.

In this situation collaboration with foreign specialists, especially Americans, which we are now morally prepared for, will help to prevent hasty political decisions. Russia could follow the U.S. example and proclaim it a national task to enhance the safety of destroyed and remaining nuclear weapons. And it could ensure the fulfillment of this national task by means of appropriate state, legal, financial, and organizational and technical measures and by elaborating and adopting safety criteria that are the same for all nuclear countries. It could also coordinate and finalize a number of technologies and procedures meeting safety criteria and indicators. In particular, technologies for storage and transportation and for utilization; the production of new types of nuclear weapons and modernization of old ones; national and world systems for detecting and reacting to accidents.

One final point. One of the most important directions in conversion in the next 10-15 years will certainly be work to reduce nuclear arsenals and ensure their safety. So maybe our nuclear specialists should be engaged in this work instead of inventing some new sphere of activity for them?

Participants Review Nuclear Arms Conference

LD0105172292 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network
in Estonian 1700 GMT 26 Apr 92

[Excerpts] Participants of the international conference against nuclear weapons gave a news conference in Tallinn today. Hubert Veldermann was also present.

[Veldermann] The highly timely scientific conference on the prevention of the use and proliferation of nuclear weapons, which is causing concern to all people, lasted three days in Parnu and ended today with a news conference. The subject was the effect of the disintegration of the USSR on the accidental or unauthorized use of weapons of mass destruction.

The conference was convened by our Institute of Philosophy, Sociology, and Law; the Center for International and Strategic Studies at the University of California, and the Swedish Initiative Group for Avoiding Accidental Nuclear Wars. Prominent scientists, doctors, and professors from the United States, West European countries, as well as from Russia, Ukraine, and Byelorussia took part. Scientists-military experts, generals, and colonels from NATO, as well as from the United States, Russia, Sweden, and Germany also took part.

Mr. Karl Rebane, academician of the Estonian Academy of Sciences, what was special about the conference which has now ended?

[Rebane] What was special was that this time it was a conference for scientists. The majority of the scientists currently hold very important posts. [passage omitted] So they are also people personally involved in politics. Discussions were of a fairly conflicting nature. At the same time I must admit that in tone they remained scientific. The view we were left with at the conference is that it is in the interests of mankind—that is, in brief, also in the interests of Russia, Kazakhstan, and also the Estonian people—that nuclear weapons are not allowed to proliferate.

Legally however, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, or Byelarus are not nuclear states. [Passage indistinct] Even though they have nuclear weapons on their territory they have no potential for the manufacture of nuclear weapons; they have no possibility to operate or command nuclear weapons. [passage omitted]

Another aspect which I liked—and here we all were of the same opinion—was that in the present situation, and this concerns also Estonian [word indistinct], this also concerns the withdrawal of the Russian troops. One of the most important tasks in order to increase stability, both political and military stability, is serious work needs to be put in to increase trust. The Estonian leadership and the Estonian people, too, should know precisely what kind of army we have on this territory and how large it is. [passage omitted]

Another new aspect was that at the last conference in Copenhagen I spoke about nuclear power stations. This time there was more talk about nuclear power stations, and nuclear power stations were seen as being equal to nuclear [word indistinct] even. In fact, the difference is major, but as the danger of an intentional nuclear war has receded considerably, then it is understandable that this next danger is perhaps the greatest, this psychological danger of nuclear power stations. [Passage indistinct]

GRU Chief on Arms Control Verification Role

PM0105131592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 29 Apr 92 pp 2, 4

[Interview with Colonel General Yevgeniy Timokhin, chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate and deputy

chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces General Staff, by correspondent Lieutenant Colonel N. Poroskov; place, date of interview not given: "Main Intelligence Directorate: You Can See the Whole World From This Building..."]

[Excerpts] A year ago the doors of the gloomy building on the Lubyanka were opened to journalists for the first time. At the time a lot was written about this and scenes were included as sensational material in television broadcasts.

Our correspondent has visited a similar, no less serious and secret organization—the General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU], codenamed "the aquarium" in the press. Obviously since the publication abroad of the book of the same name by a former GRU officer under the pseudonym of Viktor Suvorov. Or because of the abundance of glass in the building, situated on a quiet Moscow street. [passage omitted]

[Poroskov] Is monitoring compliance with arms reduction agreements part of your duties?

[Timokhin] Within the framework of its competence, the GRU takes part in the work of the National Center for Reducing the Nuclear Danger. This concerns, for example, monitoring the observance by the United States of the bilateral Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the intermediate-range and shorter-range missile treaty, which has now been implemented. By means of national technical means of verification—that is, space apparatus and radioelectronic intelligence, among other things. Use of them was envisaged by the contracting parties.

The directorate takes part in expert assessments of the composition and state of strategic offensive arms and the content of initiatives and proposals put forward by the partners in the talks in this sphere and monitors implementation of the ABM Treaty by the U.S. side. The agreements are being complied with, disarmament is a reliably verified process.

[Poroskov] Thank you for your account of what the GRU is doing at present. I am not asking you about future plans.

[Timokhin] You are right. Clearly, you have sensed the atmosphere which reigns in our building.

START TALKS

Russian Spokesman on Other Nuclear Republics

'Unaware' of START Role

LD3004121792 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1113 GMT 30 Apr 92

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondents Sergey Nikishov and Sergey Ryabikin]

[Text] Moscow, April 30 TASS—The Russian Foreign Ministry is unaware that the four nuclear states of the former Soviet Union and the United States will be parties to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), a senior Russian spokesman said at a briefing here today.

Russian Foreign Ministry Information and Press Directorate Chief Sergey Yastrzhembskiy said the Russian Foreign Ministry made this statement in conjunction with the Ukrainian News Agency's report quoting President Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine as saying in the run-up to his visit to the United States that there exists such an accord and that a meeting of the four foreign ministers and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker to sign a protocol to the treaty is scheduled to be held shortly.

"The all-important part of any agreement to ratify the START Treaty is the reiteration that the nuclear non-proliferation regime is not undermined," Yastrzhembskiy stressed. "Therefore, Russia persistently works for Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Byelarus to become as soon as possible parties to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as states which do not possess this weapon."

Yastrzhembskiy said this stance of Russia is also supported by the West. However, the Ukrainian side has so far refused to assume specific commitments as to when it will accede to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. "If Ukraine decides to take this ripe step, Russia will certainly welcome it," Yastrzhembskiy stressed.

Urges Nonproliferation Adherence

OW3004182492 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1423 GMT 30 Apr 92

[Report by diplomatic correspondents Mikhail Mayorov, Igor Porshnev, and others; from "Diplomatic Panorama"—transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Russian Foreign Ministry stands for Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Byelarus to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty as soon as possible, as non-nuclear states.

At the April 30 briefing in the Russian Foreign Ministry press center the Director of the Foreign Ministry's Department for information and press Sergey Yastrzhembskiy stated that for the time being Ukraine refused to take obligations of such kind. According to him, if Ukraine undertakes such movements and joins the Treaty than Russia will greet this fact.

Mentioning the statement of the Ambassador at large Yuriy Dubinin, Sergey Yastrzhembskiy refuted information that the Russian Foreign Ministry does not participate in the negotiations on dividing the Black Sea Fleet going on in Odessa.

S. Yastrzhembskiy also said that Philip Sidorskiy was appointed Ambassador of Russia to Uzbekistan, who worked as an Adviser of Envoy in the Russian Embassy in Kabul. He was born in 1937, Russian. [as received]

Kozyrev, Baker Discuss START Implementation

LD0305122192 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1142 GMT 3 May 92

[Text] Moscow, 3 May (ITAR-TASS)—It is reported by the Russian Foreign Ministry's information and press department that on 1 and 2 May there were detailed telephone conversations between Andrey Kozyrev, the Russian Federation's foreign minister, and James Baker, the U.S. secretary of state. They discussed a basic framework for bringing the START treaty into operation which would make it possible for the other states in whose territory strategic offensive armaments are located to carry out in an organically interrelated way their obligations to assist in eliminating these armaments no later than during the seven-year term and to accede as soon as possible to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty as nonnuclear countries.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

ABM Treaty Considered Barrier to Joint SDI

PM0105154392 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
24 Apr 92 Morning Edition p 6

[Article by international law expert Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov under the general heading: "Concept of Nuclear Deterrence Must Be Unshakable"]

[Text] The experts are still debating Russia's recent arms control initiatives. In contrast to recent times, however, the chorus of voices sounds rather discordant. Arithmetical calculations suggest that constructive critics seem to slightly outnumber no less constructive supporters of the proposals. However, legal experts are heard among neither group.

Yet some of the ideas on which the Russian initiatives are based give rise to questions from the viewpoint of the international legal obligations which Russia has inherited from the USSR. In this connection I am alarmed by the possibility of destructive intrusion into the domain of the Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty), which has regulated activity in the sphere of ABM defenses for almost 20 years.

This intrusion could begin if a global ABM shield using developments within the framework of the U.S. SDI program and our own scientific achievements is jointly created and commissioned. Despite Russia's proclaimed loyalty to the ABM Treaty, this proposal in its present form could lead to the violation of several basic commitments under the treaty.

Let us begin with the fact that the treaty, which juridically established the concept of nuclear deterrence, is based on a paradoxical surrogate for trust: Aware of their ability to destroy each other many times over, the sides essentially renounce all attempts to counter this threat and consciously agree to be helpless to oppose a destructive strike. They are forced to trust the instinct of

self-preservation of their partner, who, aware that he is defenseless against a retaliatory strike, will not deliver a first strike.

That is why the fundamental commitment under the treaty is the renunciation of the creation of the basis for ABM defenses of the whole country's territory. Only strictly limited deployment of ABM systems (in a single area) is permitted. However, a global system with space-based elements would be most suitable for territorial ABM defenses.

In detailing this main commitment, the treaty prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of mobile ABM components, including space-based components. But the "disarmament" proposals under consideration refer to orbital devices. Sensors which are only capable of registering missile launches are one thing—that does not constitute a violation of the treaty. But if it is a question of these devices being able to guide interceptors to missiles that have been launched, thereby performing the function of ABM radar, this would be a blatant violation of the treaty, which only permits stationary, land-based military radar.

Finally, the provisions of the ABM Treaty oblige the signatories not to share ABM components, technical descriptions, or blueprints with anyone. In my view, neither the Russian nor the English text can be interpreted as leaving a loophole for any "barter" between the sides themselves. Although it is clear that without this a "global shield" cannot be built by joint efforts.

So what is to be done? Some experts propose that we abandon the ABM Treaty and join in SDI, as they believe that the Americans are prepared to extend the principles of humanitarian aid to high technology. Others hint at the possibility of "slightly relaxing the restrictive terms" of the treaty, although they do not always understand the nature of these terms.

Although the treaty is of unlimited duration, it allows for either side to exercise its state sovereignty and withdraw. In that case, however, the signatory who believes that he has no further need of the treaty must indicate the "exceptional circumstances which have placed his highest interests in jeopardy" and forced him to abrogate his commitments. Is there convincing evidence that such circumstances now exist? If there is, the conclusion on this score must be passed by the legislative authorities empowered to ratify and dissolve treaties of this nature.

I agree that some amendments to and agreed interpretations of the treaty have been needed for a long time and that in some cases the need is becoming increasingly obvious. Only we must not forget that the ratification of agreed amendments and, accordingly, the issuing of permission for additional work within a new treaty framework and also for the budgetary financing of this work is likewise the prerogative of legislators.

In broader terms, it is not so much a question of the ABM Treaty. In many other cases as well the authors of

important foreign policy documents are forgetting the well known Latin dictum: "The law may be harsh, but it is the law."

We do not have to look far for examples of the law being disregarded: More than enough are provided by the treaty-making activities of the CIS. We decide the fate of our strategic forces without giving them any clear definition; or else the definition we do give either allows absolutely everything to be included, right down to the tugboat which tows a submarine from the base, or excludes components such as aircraft carriers. We sign an agreement on the status of these forces establishing in one clause that it comes into force after ratification by all signatories, and in the next that it comes into effect from the moment of signing.

Does the distinctive nature of the "current moment" justify this kind of absurdity? Not unless the claim to be building a democratic, "rule-of-law" state (it would be interesting to know what else a democratic state could be) is a hollow declaration. Regardless of the bustle of everyday concerns, it would be worthwhile to think about the stabilizing, conservative—in the good sense of the word—role played by the law and measure political steps against it beforehand, so that official legislators do not have to give them a legal basis retroactively, as in the past. (Footnote) (Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov is 36 years old, a candidate of juridical sciences, a lecturer in international law, and the author of research into the legal problems of international security and disarmament which has been published in the United States, Britain, and other countries.)

Azerbaijan Radar Station Closing Debated

*OW0205160892 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1538 GMT 2 May 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The National Council of the Azeri parliament has set up a commission on exploration of the ecological situation in the Gabelinsky region of the republic, where one of the largest air-defense radar stations has been operating for several years. Ecologists are in favor of closing the station, since, in their opinion, it poses a serious threat to the environment and people's health.

However, a high-ranking official of the CIS Air-Defense Forces told the "TURAN" News Agency that the radar station cannot be shut down because of its strategic importance. He said the station provides the surveillance of inter-continental ballistic missiles and "its closing would mean the destruction of the CIS nuclear umbrella". Besides, he stated that the station is ecologically harmless.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Reports on Latvian-Russian Troop Withdrawal Talks

New Timetable Proposed

*LD0105173392 Riga Radio Riga International
in Latvian 1930 GMT 27 Apr 92*

[Excerpt] From today until 29 April in Moscow there will be another meeting of the Latvian and Russian working group of experts, formed a couple of months ago, to prepare and coordinate a text acceptable to both sides for a treaty on the terms, schedule, and arrangements for the full withdrawal of the former USSR armed forces which are under Russia's jurisdiction, and their legal status during the withdrawal. The official delegation of Latvia at the bilateral talks is to demand that the neighboring state's troops leave Riga by October this year, and the whole territory of Latvia by September 1993.

The Latvian group of experts is led by Deputy Minister of Defense Dainis Turlajs. In this connection interest was also drawn to reports of the offer by the administration of the State of Delaware in the United States to build residential homes in Russia for officers leaving the Baltic states. This project would allow Russia to withdraw its troops from the Baltics within two years. Delaware is currently awaiting a final decision from the Baltic states and confirmation from the Russian Government. The project does not envisage any financial or material investments from Latvia; the one paying would be Russia, in natural resources and loans from U.S. banks. [passage omitted]

Experts Begin Talks

*LD0105221992 Riga Radio Riga Network
in Latvian 1730 GMT 28 Apr 92*

[Report from Moscow by correspondent Peteris Austrums]

[Text] The group of experts from Latvia, led by [Deputy Defense Minister] Dainis Turlajs, which is in Moscow to prepare a treaty on the withdrawal of the Russian Army and its temporary presence in Latvia, continued its work.

During the meeting at the Russian Foreign Ministry, the Latvian side presented its [word indistinct] of the previous round of talks at Ligatne, specifying its views on questions relating to the withdrawal of the Russian Army and its temporary presence on Latvian territory.

The Russian side, led by Sergey Zotov, head of the group of experts and the head of the [word indistinct] talks with Latvia, explained that because he is now head of the delegation for the bilateral talks with Latvia, the experts group will in future be headed by (Viktor Sikalov), a senior official of the Russian Foreign Ministry.

The talks took place in two discussion groups. One is discussing legal property matters and the social aspects

of the Army's withdrawal; the other is considering the specifications for the new talks with Russia on the period of withdrawal.

Ambassador to UN Protests

*LD0305205792 Riga Radio Riga Network
in Latvian 1730 GMT 3 May 92*

[Text] Aivars Baumanis, permanent authorized ambassador of the Republic of Latvia to the United Nations, has presented an official memorandum to the UN Security Council, protesting against the supplementing of the former USSR Army troops on the territory of the Republic of Latvia with new contingents subject to Russian jurisdiction. Documents of similar contents were presented to the Security Council by Lithuanian and Estonian diplomats as well.

Russian Spokesman Raps Latvian Envoy's Statements

*LD0505190692 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1604 GMT 5 May 92*

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondents Sergey Staroselskiy and Vasilii Titov]

[Text] Moscow May 5 TASS—Speaking to journalists in Helsinki recently, Latvian Ambassador to Russia Mr. Peters permitted himself statements distorting the de facto picture of Latvian-Russian relations and containing arbitrary evaluations of the Russian Government's policy, a senior Russian spokesman said at a Foreign Ministry briefing today.

Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, chief of the Russian Foreign Ministry Information and Press Department, emphasized that Mr. Peters's statements that "negotiations between Russia and Latvia on troop pullout have not yet actually been started," do not correspond to reality. In this regard, Yastrzhembskiy recalled that talks between the two countries' state delegations were held in Riga on February 1, 1992 and groups of experts were formed upon the results of the talks and have already held three sessions since then.

As for the ambassador's deliberations concerning rifts between Russian diplomats and military on troop withdrawal, this is "nothing short of a hackneyed method which is in effect equal to deliberate misinformation," Yastrzhembskiy observed.

The tactless nature of some of the ambassador's public statements addressed to the host country, which is at odds with the universally recognised diplomatic standards, generates amazement in the Russian Foreign Ministry, Yastrzhembskiy stressed.

Baltic Delegations Discuss Russian Withdrawal*LD0205181292 Riga Radio Riga Network
in Latvian 0430 GMT 29 Apr 92*

[Text] Addressing the seminar entitled Stability and Security in the Baltic Region, the delegations of the three Baltic states recognized the soonest possible determination of the schedule and deadline for the withdrawal of the Russian Army as the most important condition for guaranteeing that security. The representatives of Lithuania and Estonia think that the Russian Army must leave the territory of these states by the end of 1992.

In addition, Lithuania has resolved to hold a referendum on this question. As we have already reported, Latvia intends to demand in its talks with Russia the withdrawal of the troops from Riga by October 1992 and from the rest of Latvian territory by the end of 1993. The Lithuanian representative at this seminar emphasized that the Russian Army is conducting unsanctioned movements on the territory of Lithuania, is disrupting the guarding of Lithuania's borders by not allowing Lithuanian representatives to inspect the territory of the army units, nor has it provided official information about the composition and armaments of the troops that are located on Lithuanian territory.

The chairman of the Estonian Supreme Council's Foreign Affairs Commission, Indrek Toome, reported that at the moment Russian troops are still occupying 80,000 hectares of Estonian territory, and its composition is from 25-27,000 men. The value of the arms and army property seized in 1940 from Estonia by the Soviet Army would today be about \$300 million. Indrek Toome emphasized that Estonia will (?itself take care of providing) the defense of its country; (?therefore) we are ready to take part in international structures that will guarantee such security.

The commander of the Northwestern Military Group, Colonel-General Valeriy Mironov, did not state any specific deadlines for the withdrawal of the troops, emphasizing that on the Baltic states' side there was a perceptible striving to unilaterally make political capital without regard for the interests of the other side, namely Russia. Mironov spoke of how all the army property is being declared the property of the Baltic states. For example, there had been demands, quote, for huge numbers of weapons that were not even at the disposal of the Northwestern Military Group. Commander Valeriy Mironov noted that for the removal of the army officers alone from the Baltic states, more than 32,000 apartments would need to be built.

Further on Lithuanian Calls for Russian Troop Pullout**Withdrawal Referendum Resolution***LD0105180892 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1200 GMT 1 May 92*

[Text] In accordance with a resolution of the Lithuanian parliament, the following text will be included in the referendum bulletin on the former USSR Army, to be held on 14 June:

I demand that the withdrawal of the former USSR Army from the territory of the Lithuanian Republic should be started immediately, or completed in 1992; and that damage caused to the Lithuanian people and the state should be compensated for—yes/no. The answer expressing the will of the citizen should not be deleted.

Delegate Comments*LD0105213192 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1900 GMT 1 May 92*

[Report by correspondent A. Chernaya in the ""Vesti"" newscast]

[Text] Although there have been three meetings of the groups of experts of Russia, Latvia, and Lithuania who have been attempting to reach agreement on the withdrawal of the former Soviet—now Russian—troops, Aleksandr Bishala, leader of the Lithuanian delegation, considers that:

[Begin Bishala recording] The talks have made hardly any progress. Despite the assurances, even official ones, given at previous meetings of experts, military personnel are still being brought in, and not singly but in hundreds. They are being brought in illegally, either through military airfields or by rail, dressed as civilians. [end recording]

[Chernaya] Army recruits were detained on 30 April at [name indistinct] railway station. Following instructions, they went into Lithuanian territory from Schelkovo in Moscow Oblast. They were given food and tea and sent back. Several notes have already been sent to Russia's Foreign Ministry, as yet unanswered. The arrival of army recruits in Lithuania violates the laws of the Lithuanian Republic and the decisions of the Lithuanian Government. [video shows soldiers' documents and rail tickets]

Russian Official Confirms Timetable*OW0405134792 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1334 GMT 4 May 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The withdrawal of troops of the former Soviet Union, presently under Russian jurisdiction, from the territory of Lithuania will be completed after 1995, averred Fedor Shelov-Kovedyayev, Russia's first deputy minister of foreign affairs, at his meeting with journalists in Vilnius this Monday [4 May], following his first talks with the Lithuanian Government officials. He tied the withdrawal terms to the progress made in house construction in the troop relocation areas. In the words of Shelov-Kovedyayev, Russia is prepared to accelerate the troops withdrawal as much as possible.

Answering INTERFAX's question, Fedor Shelov-Kovedyayev admitted that the Russian side is prepared to address property claims by Lithuania, as well as

reimbursement of damage attributed to the stay of the former Soviet troops in Lithuania.

Problems of Troop Withdrawal From Germany Viewed

Official on Financial, Housing Problems

*PM0505103692 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 5 May 92 p7*

[Interview with Aleksandr Temerko, chairman of the Committee for Social Provision for Servicemen, by correspondent Vitaliy Buzuyev; place and date not given: "Aleksandr Temerko: Playing at Soldiers Costs Too Much"]

[Text] No sooner had Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov returned from a trip to Germany, when a Russian delegation headed by his first deputy, Sergey Filatov, set off for that country. It comprises parliamentarians, representatives of the Russian Federation Government, military experts, and journalists. "We are to visit the Western Group of Forces (WGF), which is temporarily stationed in the FRG," our correspondent was told by one of the participants in the visit, Aleksandr Temerko, chairman of the Committee for Social Provision for Servicemen. We asked him a few questions.

[Buzuyev] The intergovernmental agreement with Germany on the time scale for withdrawing the troops was signed by the leaders of the former Union. With the formation of the CIS, the situation regarding the armed forces changed radically. Will this affect the time scale for withdrawal of the WGF?

[Temerko] We are doing everything possible to complete the troop withdrawal on schedule—by 1994. On average some 30 percent of the WGF personnel are being withdrawn each year. However, with the formation of the CIS, additional problems certainly arose in connection, for instance, with the fact that the Baltic countries and Ukraine are demanding hard currency for the passage of troops and military equipment through their territory. The position of the Baltic countries did not surprise us. However, Ukraine's stance is perplexing, to say the least, because that country, together with Byelarus and Russia, was originally defined as an interested party in the operation to withdraw the troops stationed in Germany. Under these circumstances we were forced to bring into operation the port of Rostock-Mukran, but its potential is not unlimited.

[Buzuyev] Keeping our troops in Germany costs a fortune. What are the sources of finance for the WGF military subunits and for the actual withdrawal operation?

[Temerko] The German side has allocated funds of 15 billion German marks [DM]. Of this, DM7.8 billion is compensation for housing construction expenditure. These funds are intended for the construction of 4 million square meters of housing—for approximately

40,000 servicemen. DM0.2 billion is allocated for the training and retraining of servicemen discharged to the reserve, and, lastly, DM7 billion is being channeled into a special transitional fund to pay the expenses of maintaining and withdrawing the troops (DM4 billion has been transferred on a nonrepayable basis, and DM3 billion as interest-free credit which we will have to repay). The fact that these funds are insufficient is another matter. The government of the former Union had already encroached on our "army purse," in part in order to extinguish the foreign debt. Lastly, over the last two years the cost of public utilities and other services has increased in Germany. So additional sources of currency will have to be found.

[Buzuyev] What, for instance?

[Temerko] We are expecting to receive a substantial sum from the sale of WGF property. In all we estimate this—and incidentally we made our estimates by the German method—at DM12 billion. For a long time the Germans were opposed to the idea of opening two accounts: a Russian one and a German one, and wanted the money from the sale of WGF property to go into a single combined account which could not be used by either side until mutual claims had been settled. But only recently this obstacle was removed. The Germans came halfway to meet us and gave us permission to auction the property and channel the funds thus obtained into resolving social problems in Russia.

[Buzuyev] How fast is the construction of housing for servicemen returning home going?

[Temerko] Alas, the picture is not very bright as yet. Primarily because the DM7.8 billion that was released for housing construction was frozen. It is no sin against the truth if I say that this was the fault of the Ukrainian side. Initially, when the Union leaders signed the agreement on the timetable for the troop withdrawal, it was specified that 17 camps were to be built in Ukraine (with one camp for approximately 2,000 families), seven in Russia, and eight in Byelarus. But given that the WGF was taken under Russia's jurisdiction by a decree of President B. Yeltsin, that it is being withdrawn by Russia, and that the greater part of the servicemen—more than 70 percent—are Russians, we proposed the following apportionment. Two camps would be built in Ukraine, 15 in Russia, and seven in Byelarus. Ukraine does not agree with this.

It does not want servicemen billeted there today—there have been plenty of cases where people were lured there, arrived in Ukraine, and then were turned away point-blank, so to speak. But when it comes to housing construction, the Ukrainian leaders demand that we adhere to the figures approved by the government of the former Union. And when Colonel General P. Grachev, leader of the special interdepartmental commission concerned with the full range of WGF problems, had received the go-ahead in principle for our "Russian"

adjustment to the housing construction plan, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, on a visit to Bonn, stated at official level that he does not recognize that commission and knows nothing about its objectives. Naturally, the reaction followed speedily: The Germans froze the DM7.8 billion that were designated for housing construction. The enormous efforts made by Grachev basically came to nothing. Politicians playing at soldiers costs too much.

[Buzuyev] And what is the solution?

[Temerko] I very much hope that this visit by our delegation, headed by Sergey Filatov, will help to clarify matters. The German side will at last recognize the interdepartmental commission's powers.

[Buzuyev] Aleksandr Viktorovich, Britain's ITN television recently reported that the former Soviet troops leaving Germany are leaving ecologically polluted territories behind them. It went on to report that the German side has filed large material claims against Russia. Is this true?

[Temerko] No claims have been filed officially. But according to information that has filtered through to the press, it is true that a number of Germany's leaders and German parliamentarians think we should pay for the ecologically polluted territories. And an incredible sum has been mentioned—from DM15 billion to 30 billion. We do not agree with that estimate, although we think there is a problem, and we will discuss it in Germany and look for a compromise. We intend to use the services of the American firm ICF, which acted as intermediary in a similar situation when our troops left Hungary.

[Buzuyev] Will the problem of servicemen who have left their subunits and requested asylum in Germany be discussed during your meetings with German leaders? Incidentally, could you tell us how many of these servicemen there are?

[Temerko] I do not think this question will come up. In two years something like 300 men in all have deserted from the WGF. Many of them decided to go back when they realized that here in the FRG nobody wants them and they are unlikely to be able to find their feet. In general the Germans are reluctant to provide information about these men. A lengthy judicial procedure awaits them. The decision takes two to five years. By that time the WGF will have left the FRG completely. Let me note in particular that the Germans are afraid that servicemen may desert en masse. However, this has not happened. The WGF is one of our best military units. Despite the difficulties experienced, the servicemen's morale is quite high.

[Buzuyev] You will still be in Germany on 9 May. No doubt it will be difficult to discuss the problem of our troops' withdrawal on Victory Day.

[Temerko] We are not the only ones leaving Germany today, the Americans, the French, and the British are

going too. This is a normal process symbolizing the end of the cold war. Incidentally, on 9 May, Victory Day, or Liberation Day as they call it in Germany, we intend to hold a small parade in Berlin. We hope our presence will be seen by the WGF servicemen as proof that their problems are being dealt with at a very high level. A decree by President B. Yeltsin in connection with the formation of the Russian Armed Forces is also being prepared for that date.

Legislators, German Military Meet

LD0505220492 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service*
in Russian 1215 GMT 5 May 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Konstantin Savvin]

[Text] Wuensdorf, 5 May—A delegation of Russian legislators touring the Western Group of Forces [WGF] met with members of the WGF military council and command here today.

Sergey Filatov, the leader of the delegation and Russian Supreme Soviet first deputy chairman, spoke of the problems that the deputies will aim to solve during their WGF tour. These include studying problems with the withdrawal of troops from Germany (which should be completed in 1994) and briefing personnel on the situation in Russia and other CIS countries.

Sergey Filatov told them that the Russian president on 7 May will sign a decree on creating a Russian army and a Russian defense ministry.

Colonel General Matvey Burlakov, WGF commander in chief, and members of the group's military council reported on the WGF's state of affairs and on the military units' tasks.

The delegation then divided into three groups and left to visit WGF military units.

Reports on Russian Troop Withdrawal From Estonia

Russian Envoy, Estonian Chairman Confer

OW0605232092 Moscow *BALTFAX in English*
1344 GMT 6 May 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] During the talks in Tallinn (May 6) between the Russian president's special envoy Feodor Shelov-Kovedyayev and chairman of the Estonian parliament Arnold Ruutel the Russian side urged its partners to put bilateral relations on a legal footing. The proposal was made to define the status of the former Union's troops which are located in Estonia and which are under Russia's jurisdiction. The presence of these 30,000-strong troops, the property questions and the problems facing ethnic Russians (making up one third of Estonia's population of 1.5 million) are the main issues to be tackled by the Russian and Estonian state delegations.

Their next meeting will take place in Moscow on May 15 and is expected to decide the future of the former Union's frontier troops.

The Russian delegation emphasized that the schedule of withdrawal depends on technical matters and on the readiness of the places of re-dislocation. The year 1997 was named as the most probable date for the end of withdrawal.

Envoy Comments

OW0605193192 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1851 GMT 6 May 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russia's First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Fedor Shelov-Kovediayev, who was in Tallinn on a one-day visit, maintains it would be impossible for Russia to withdraw its troops stationed in Estonia in 1992, said Estonian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Trivimi Velliste in an interview to BALTFAX correspondent. He noted that in the opinion of Shelov-Kovediayev, complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia can be accomplished only in 1997-1998. At the same time, Russia's first deputy minister of foreign affairs confirmed that his country "has no strategic interests in Estonia, and it intends to withdraw all of its units from the country", Trivimi Velliste emphasized.

Russian Submarine Crews Preparing To Depart

OW0605232192 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1344 GMT 6 May 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Estonian Deputy Minister of Defense Toomas Puura told "BF" [BALTFAX] that the sailors on submarines who were retrained on the CIS naval base in Paldiski will leave Estonia in the near future. According to him that were the last crews which were retrained on the Estonian territory.

127 submarine's sailors arrived to Estonia by a military aircraft end March (without the consent of the local authorities—"BF"). After negotiations they were allowed to stay in Paldiski one more month. A training center for atomic submarines' crews is located in Paldiski.

According to T. Puura, the CIS military servicemen want to receive the consent of the Estonian authorities to send 3100 conscripts to the republic who are to replace the demobilized servicemen. The Estonian Deputy Minister of Defense considers that the Russian party has no legal base for such actions.

Kazakhstan Ready for Conventional Arms Cuts

OW0705184592 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1754 GMT 7 May 92

[From "Presidential Bulletin"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On Wednesday [6 May] President Nursultan Nazarbayev received the US ambassador to the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] John Maresk now discussing the interaction of new members of the CSCE in Alma-Ata. They spoke of political and economic changes in Kazakhstan, guarantees of human rights and stability in ethnic relations. Nuclear disarmament and the participation of Kazakhstan in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe were also discussed.

In the opinion of the American diplomat, Western approaches to security have greatly changes since cold war times. New independent states have appeared on the political map, therefore the main task of the CSCE now is to change its objectives. "We want the conference to react timely to the changes in the former USSR", he said and added that security in Europe, support for democracy and human rights will remain the main concerns of the CSCE.

On military security President Nazarbayev said that Kazakhstan is ready for notable cuts in conventional armaments, however, in his opinion this is a matter of more than one day and requires the efforts of all CIS members.

The US ambassador to the CSCE said that as a strong Asian state Kazakhstan can and must play a leading role in Asia acting as a guarantor of peace, democracy and stability in that part of the world.

Both sides agreed that conflicts breaking out in different parts of the former Union should be prevented before they take place. The UN peace-making force could play a leading role in this respect.

In an interview with IF [INTERFAX] Mr. Maresk said that in mid-July Helsinki will host a summit meeting of the CSCE that will be attended for the first time by the 15 states of the former Union. In his opinion Kazakhstan will be in the center of attention as a leading Asian nuclear power. Participants in the Helsinki conference would want to hear about the military needs of Kazakhstan and its planned steps in military security.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Pollution Measured After Arctic Bomb Tests

PM0505084192 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 2000 GMT 1 May 92

[Video report by L. Obukhova and V. Galnykin; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Excerpt] [video shows bay and beached vessel] [Obukhova] This is the first time that our program has carried a report on the results of the ecological expedition to Novaya Zemlya, Franz Josef Land, and the Kola Peninsula. The international ecological expedition included ecologists from the United States, Germany, Poland, Norway, and Russia.

Man-made pollution in the Arctic amounts to 600-900 becquerels; there are samples of strontium and cesium in the soil and seabed deposits. After analyzing their findings, today's ecologists have concluded that the results of the nuclear explosions on Novaya Zemlya have had an impact on living organisms in the Arctic within a 2,000-km radius.

Apart from Novaya Zemlya, radioactive impurities have been left by nuclear submarines, and all living organisms have reacted to the environmental situation that has developed in the North. Nuclear tests were carried out depending on the weather: Scientists would wait a month or two for southerly winds, then there would be an explosion, and the radioactive cloud would be carried northward. This is why the ecologists recorded huge levels of radioactive contamination in Franz Josef Land and on the Kola Peninsula. [passage omitted] [video shows views of Arctic scenery]

Krasnoyarsk Checks Nuclear Tests' Claims

*OW0305123292 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1150 GMT 3 May 92*

["Were Nuclear Tests Run in Krasnoyarsk Territory?"—transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] In the 1960s and 1970s tests of nuclear weapons were run in the region of the river Pelyatka, said Vladimir Vengo, Chairman of the Ust-Yeniseysk regional council. Roman Solntsev, state secretary of the territorial administration, announced that according to his sources, about 10 neutron charges were blasted under the pretext of geological prospecting, emitting strong radiation.

The worried deputies of the Ust-Yeniseysk region asked the territorial council to send in a commission to measure the radiation levels.

If this information is confirmed, representatives of the territorial administration do not rule out the possibility of lodging a suit worth billions of rubles against the Ministry for Atomic Power Engineering.

Nuclear Minister Meets Swedish Official

*LD0405200892 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1902 GMT 4 May 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Dmitriy Gorokhov]

[Text] Stockholm May 4 TASS—Sweden is very concerned about a possible resumption of nuclear tests on Novaya Zemlya, Foreign Minister Margaretha Uglas

told visiting Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov today, according to the Swedish Foreign Ministry press service.

Stockholm favors a complete ban on nuclear explosions, Uglas said.

Explaining the position of the Russian Government, Mikhailov said that President Yeltsin had ordered a moratorium on tests until the end of the year. Their total ban will depend on analogous steps by the United States, he said.

The sides also discuss non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Russian minister denied rumors about emigration of nuclear experts from Russia.

Kazakh Deputy Premier on Effects of Testing

*AU0605091892 Vienna Oesterreich Eins Radio
Network in German 0500 GMT 6 May 92*

[Interview with Kazakh Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets by Jochen Bendele in Klagenfurt; date not given—recorded; Soskovets statements in Russian with superimposed German translation]

[Text] [Bendele] It was only a few years ago that millions of people in the vicinity of the nuclear test site of Semipalatinsk began to understand the effects of the more than 400 nuclear explosions under and above ground. It has been assumed that some 500,000 people have been negatively affected, with consequences for the following generations. There is evidence of an increase in the infant mortality rate as a result of cancer and tuberculosis.

So what is the situation really like there?

[Soskovets] Unfortunately, I cannot give you any concrete figures, because we do not have any. Nevertheless, it is true that there are people who bear visible signs of the effects of radiation. We are now taking measures to avoid further risks.

[Bendele] What measures?

[Soskovets] The president recently banned such tests. The scientific-technological center, which used to serve military purposes, is now used by the authorities as a civilian institution.

[Bendele] Experts have worked out that the rehabilitation program would require 500 million rubles. Is Kazakhstan able to raise such large amounts of money despite the economic crisis?

[Soskovets] It is possible that the operation will cost even more. Nevertheless, there is no alternative. We have to do something to improve the situation there.

[Bendele] Nuclear opponents have claimed that Russia is planning to resume nuclear arms tests. Can you rule out such plans for Kazakhstan?

[Soskovets] As far as Russia is concerned, you have to ask Yeltsin. Our policy is aimed at removing all nuclear arms from our territory.

[Bendele] International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War have demanded that Russia, Byelarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan be declared nuclear-free zones. Can you support such a demand as far as Kazakhstan is concerned.

[Soskovets] Yes, absolutely.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR BW Program, Treaty Violations Viewed

924P0129A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 30 Apr 92 p 1

[Article by V. Umnov: "After 20 Years of Silence the Soviet Microbes Are Talking"]

[Text] For a long time we could not bring ourselves to publish this material—we were restrained by our obligations to people who at one time had given a written undertaking "not to divulge" what they were doing. Today, when the Russian President's ukase "On Ensuring Compliance With International Obligations in the Field of Biological Weapons [BW]" has been promulgated, I consider these restrictions to have been lifted.

"When the three of us were left alone," Boris Nikolayevich unexpectedly announced, "I said that I could not yet give firm guarantees of honest cooperation. Certainly this is not accepted among politicians, but I said this: 'We are still deceiving you, Mr. Bush. We promised to eliminate bacteriological weapons. But some of our experts did everything possible to prevent me from learning the truth. It was not easy, but I outfoxed them. I caught them red-handed. I found two test sites. They are inoculating tracts of land with anthrax, allowing wild animals to go there and observing them...'"

M. Zakharov, "A Visit With the President,"
IZVESTIYA 22 April 1992.

A year ago a letter arrived at the editorial office. Why are all the newspapers clamoring about the death of the Aral Sea, its author wrote, without mentioning as one of the possible causes the bacteriological test site in the middle of the sea? You really should go to Vozrozhdeniye Island...

Since then, without naming the location of the "facility" we have several times published precautionary materials: Such a test site does exist, and in order to make sure that it does not present any danger for us "peaceful inhabitants" today, it would not be a bad idea to take a look at it.

We sent letters containing this request to the Ministry of Defense and later to the command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. At first they were simply not answered,

then the military physicians and chemists began to assert that there was no sense in making such a trip—they were studying quite different problems on the island. On the last occasion—that was in February—we received a refusal from the "command" of the first deputy commander, Stolyarov: There is nothing for journalists to do there.

Meanwhile we had been receiving new letters and testimony.

—"During the period 1968-1970 I served on that island. I personally took part in experiments on horses, sheep and donkeys. But there were also closed barracks where civilians worked. They kept rodents in those barracks—mice, hamsters, and guinea pigs. There were also monkeys there, we used to laugh about it: A soldier cost 1 ruble and 20 kopeks a day, but a monkey cost 4 rubles 80 kopeks...."

—"Bananas for the monkeys were delivered by aircraft. They were given alcohol to drink, and they suffered with hangovers like people, but to make up for that the anthrax could not get the better of them...."

—"I am a serviceman who served on Vozrozhdeniye Island. Instead of frightening your readers with the 'secret of the century' you would do better to think about what will happen when Kazakhstan takes this facility under its control. No one here is afraid of these weapons...."

—"The island was terrible because there was no serum. They used to give injections against venomous reptiles [sic] (tarantulas, scorpions and so forth). They used to give some other injections that would numb part of the body and raise the temperature to the maximum. The officers made no secret of the fact that there was no serum. When a man went into the test zone without chemical protection he was later carried off somewhere—destination unknown. There were cases in which gas masks malfunctioned. Soldiers used to remain silent in that kind of situation mainly out of fear of the injections.

"All testing started on Komsomolsk Island, where in 1960 an evacuation took place in mere hours in connection with a shift in the wind. We were categorically forbidden to visit it, even though it could almost be reached by wading...."

Today, according to available information, the test site has essentially been closed. And the people who should go there first are, in my opinion, not journalists but civilian ecologists, epidemiologists, biologists, chemists... The Aral is drying up, and what if small insects that were unable to swim across the sea move across on dry land to the mainland? God forbid...

We have known about bacteriological weapons for a long time. As long ago as the Great Patriotic War a book entitled "Plague" by the American military man Roseberry was published in the USSR. And evidently, we

were already concerned that the enemy might drop "a dozen or so kilograms of plague or cholera" on our territory from an aircraft. Biologists appeared within the structure of the Ministry of Defense, then entire institutes were set up....

Let me say immediately that there was nothing wrong in protecting ourselves against this terrible weapon. And for that it is necessary to know what you are protecting yourself against—artificially obtaining acute forms is a natural stage in this research. Military biologists found references to work in that field in the foreign literature and immediately brought it to their commanders' attention: See, there they are getting ahead of us and you begrudge the money.

In the early 1970's, we had, in fact, really fallen behind. The Lysenko sessions in 1948 and 1950 had hit our biologists below the belt...A Ministry of Defense commission concluded that we were catastrophically behind. In the West they had already started to do genetic engineering work with DNA, and they were actively influencing the genome and obtaining altered forms of bacteria and viruses.

As a result a series of resolutions was promulgated creating a special system.

And abroad, just imagine, it was precisely at that time that they started to work actively against this kind of research. The result was the 1972 convention totally prohibiting bacteriological weapons. And we, too, nobly signed it and in 1975, ratified it.

But the system had already been started up...

So, by the nature of the work the military penetrated into the civilian, through the Main Administration for the Microbiological Industry under the USSR Council of Ministers. The creation of this industry began in the mid-1960's, and it became famous among the people for its protein and vitamin concentrate plants.

But there was something else that the people did not know.

All this was eating up enormous amounts of money and hard currency, for molecular biology and genetics are built on the use of expensive equipment and reactors that we simply did not have.

The convention had already been signed when a bacteriological center was opened in Obolensk, near Moscow (we wrote about it on 24 September 1991) and a virology center in Koltsovo near Novosibirsk. Institutes were built in Moscow—the Biological Instrument Building Institute and the Biochemical Machine Project. The Institute for Ultrapure Drugs appeared in Leningrad. Industrial test bases were opened.

Entire faculties at a number of higher educational institutions in Moscow were entirely redirected—the Moscow Higher Technical School imeni Bauman, Moscow State University, the Second Medical Institute...

Everything seemed very simple: Take a microbe, remove its DNA, slice it, splice it, implant it in another microbe—and you have a new organism.

A resolution was passed establishing a deadline. A client comes from the Arbat bearing a document where it is already written down in detail: what it should be, how it should look, what specifications it should meet, dozens of parameters. Whether you like it or not, you have to do it.

But this did not happen. It turned out that no decision by the party or government could force a microbe to alter its face. To obtain a bacterium or virus with prespecified properties is an almost hopeless business if you do not know the nature of those properties.

And the unpleasantness started. Civilian scientists working mainly inside the system tried not to be limited to purely military tasks. By the way, it is precisely these "sidelines" that today could well become the main directions in virology, vaccination and diagnostics.

But time was needed for this. And the military tasks could not permit such indulgences. The system was happy to take on military people for leading posts; they were used to carrying out orders by the deadline.

They started to bring the affair to a close, and talks leading up to this began several years ago.

Meanwhile, in Koltsovo, for example, they learned to make interferon.

Thus, 20 years after the USSR signed the Convention prohibiting bacteriological weapons it has been disclosed that we have been violating it.

Just one thing remains to set our minds at rest: if there had been no "military," then domestic microbiology would probably not exist at all. But how its potential can be usefully employed is, of course, a matter for the experts. Experts who are mainly civilians. For example, the committee set up in February under the president of Russia on convention problems relating to chemical and biological weapons.

'No Proven Technology' for Chemical Disposal

LD0105183692 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1600 GMT 1 May 92

[Video report from Saratov by correspondent I. Deryugin; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Behind me are the gates of the central chemical depot of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. This depot stores,

among other things, 1,200 tonnes of poisonous substances. There are barrels containing mustard gas and lewisite which has been stored since World War II. These are dermatovesical poisons.

The destruction of chemical weapons in accordance with the treaty concluded with the Americans should start by the end of this year. At the present time there is no proven technology to carry out this destruction which completely satisfies both ecologists and the military. Should the chemicals be transported elsewhere, or should a factory be constructed to process them here? No decision is possible without independent expert ecological supervision of whichever method might be used. And should this issue be favorably settled, then the region would have to share in the profits, which could be considerable. A kilogram of arsenic, which can be obtained by processing lewisite is worth \$5,000 on the world market. We just need to ensure that these arsenic dollars are clean, in both the literal and a metaphorical sense.

Committee To Implement CW Destruction Accord

LD0205210892 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1710 GMT 2 May 92

[Text] The Soviet-American agreement demands that Russia should begin to destroy stocks of its chemical weapons [CW] no later than 31 December. A first practical step to this end has been taken by the forming of a special committee on chemical and biological weapons under the chairmanship of Russian President Boris Yeltsin. This is what its chairman, Academician Anatoliy Kuntsevich told our correspondent:

[Kuntsevich, in Russian fading into English translation] The committee's major task is to liquidate arsenals of chemical weapons. On a practical level this task is linked with the creating of both a material and a technical base for this work. Neither the former Soviet Union nor Russia have ever had a strategy towards destroying such weapons, therefore no legal means have been adopted and no funds allocated to this end. In addition, the key difficulty that remains outstanding is that of a site for building the facilities that are needed for the destruction of 40,000 to 50,000 tonnes of chemical weapons.

It's hard to make forecasts about the timescale to complete this work but Russia may need some 10 to 15 years. It hopes Western partners will understand since they too encounter certain difficulties. The United States, for one, intended to complete the destruction of chemical weapons this year, but now the year of 2005 has been set as the deadline.

Russia counts not only on an understanding, it counts on help too. No matter how reliable our technological programs may be there are problems with the individual elements of such an undertaking. But what is most important is to get funds for solving the many social and other problems in the regions where these facilities for destroying poisonous chemical substances will be built

and how to overcome the natural reluctance and suspicion surrounding them on the part of the local population. The United States might allocate to this end some \$100 million at present. In addition, it will be useful if European countries would take part in the process too.

CIS Spokesman Says No Chemical Weapons in Karabakh

LD0605172192 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1535 GMT 6 May 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 6 May—Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Medvedev, head of the press center of the CIS Unified Armed Forces, has refuted an allegation by the Azerbaijan agency "TURAN" that there are dumps containing 500 tonnes of chemical substances in Nagorno-Karabakh. He stressed that there was not a single dump with chemical or nuclear ammunition belonging to the CIS in the whole Transcaucasian region.

Levon Melik-Shakhnazaryan, chairman of the commission for external relations in the Karabakh parliament, told ITAR-TASS that the report about the request supposedly made by the Armenian authorities to the Russian leadership to withdraw this "invented ammunition" from the territory of the kray was also a lie. He underlined that "this misinformation was based on the fact that from the beginning of spring, a chemical decontamination battalion was deployed in Stepanakert and its main target was to liquidate consequences of chemical damage as the result of hostilities or industrial accidents. It is common knowledge that this kind of unit is not intended for chemical attacks".

Armenia Requests Removal of Chemical Weapons

LD0605153192 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian 1400 GMT 6 May 92

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] According to a TURAN agency report, Armenia has requested the Russian authorities to withdraw chemical weapons from Nagorno-Karabakh territory as soon as possible. According to certain information, the depots abandoned by CIS troops contain 500 tonnes of chemical substances.

NUCLEAR FREE ZONES & PEACE ZONES

Ukraine Advocates 'Nuclear-Free' Black Sea

LD0505122192 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0848 GMT 5 May 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Feoktistov]

[Text] Ankara, 5 May—Ukraine and Turkey advocate the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the Black Sea, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk said at a news conference at Ankara airport on 4 May before leaving Turkey. "A nuclear-free Black Sea can be a model not only for the region but for the whole world," he said. The problem of the return of Crimean Tatars to their homeland, the Ukrainian head of state commented, is not just a regional one, and must be tackled at an interstate level. The Turkish side, he stressed, was positive in its evaluation of our steps towards the repatriation of Crimean Tatars. L. Kravchuk announced that a great deal of attention was given at the Ukrainian-Turkish talks in Ankara to the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and in the Caucasus. He pointed out here that Ukraine and Turkey will do everything possible to ensure stability in this region. The sides also exchanged views regarding the future of the CIS. L. Kravchuk pointed out that unanimity was reached on all the issues discussed, and assessed the negotiations as "very positive and constructive."

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Absence of Nuclear Arms at Estonian Base Confirmed

OW2704130992 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1210 GMT 27 Apr 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Participants in the Pjarnu, Estonia, conference on nuclear security that closed Sunday [26 April] visited a strategic aviation CIS base in Tartu and made sure it does not contain any nuclear weapons.

Russian delegation member Colonel Valery Yarunich said at the news conference on the results of the work of the conference that "nuclear arms on the territory of the former USSR are under reliable control and its unsanctioned use is out of the question." The international conference in Pjarnu entitled "The influence of the USSR Breakup on the possibility of non-sanctioned or accidental use of nuclear arms" was attended by Russian, U.S., West European, Baltic, Ukrainian and Kazakh experts.

Ukraine Links Denuclearization, Security Guarantees

LD2704214792 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 27 Apr 92

[Excerpts] The Italian newspaper LA STAMPA has published an interview with President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk. We are offering for your attention a summary of that interview, which has been prepared by Natalya Paratash.

[Paratash] [passage omitted] Speaking about the nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk

stressed: Let us assume that we remove all the nuclear weapons from Ukraine and become a nuclear-free state. It is what we want. But what guarantees will there be for our security? Germany's security is for example guaranteed by NATO. Who will assign [as heard] Ukraine's security? Russia? It is possible that we would agree, but Russia keeps putting forward territorial claims to us. [passage omitted]

Ukraine, Kazakhstan Said To 'Privatize' Arsenals

Arms Control Expert Interviewed

PM3004115192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
30 Apr 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Interview with disarmament expert Aleksandr Savelyev by Sergey Guk; place and date not given: "Ukraine and Kazakhstan 'Are Privatizing' CIS Nuclear Arsenals"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Recent statements by President Nursultan Nazarbayev (guaranteeing Kazakhstan's security against nuclear attacks from the United States, Russia, or China) and Leonid Kravchuk (it is for Ukraine to decide what part of the armed forces deployed on its territory, including strategic forces, should be subordinated to the unified command) inevitably raise the question: Does anything remain of the CIS leaders' accords, or have all the states decided to follow separate paths? Will the drawn-out dispute concerning nuclear weapons—a problem that is sending Western politicians into a cold sweat—ever be resolved? For an answer to this and other questions, IZVESTIYA turned to disarmament expert Aleksandr Savelyev, vice president of the Russian National Security and Strategic Studies Institute and participant in the strategic offensive arms talks.

[Savelyev] This problem is bringing not just the West out in a cold sweat. At first it seemed that they all agreed on everything: It was necessary gradually to transfer nuclear weapons to Russia's territory. During the transitional period these weapons were to be under the CIS unified command and the "nuclear button" was to remain in the hands of the Russian president, who pledged "not to use" the button without the sanction of the heads of Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan.

However, judging by the statements of L. Kravchuk and N. Nazarbayev, both leaders now regard the nuclear weapons that happen to be on their territory as theirs. At the same time Kiev is claiming a special nuclear status for itself: Until Ukraine gets its own button, the nuclear arms deployed on its territory remain "occupation forces," L. Kravchuk has only just told a REUTER correspondent. Essentially, both republics currently are trying to provisionally "privatize" the unified nuclear arsenals.

[Guk] Yet both Nazarbayev and Kravchuk are persistently talking about a threat; is this entirely unfounded?

[Savelyev] Frankly speaking, they see this threat as emanating primarily from Russia, and therefore they are asking the West to guarantee their security. No one is denying that the former Union has entered a "dense seam" of general instability, but let us not forget that the whole world would have sounded the alarm long ago if Russia had given the least reason for it to be suspected of any kind of aggressive intentions, and in particular the threat to use nuclear weapons.

[Guk] Clearly, both leaders are convinced that having nuclear status would enhance their prestige in the world?

[Savelyev] Obviously, but if nuclear weapons were capable of contributing to states' prosperity, the USSR would have become the richest country in the world long ago. Or perhaps they are hoping that the West will recognize their nuclear status without further ado, and subsequently reward them with generous economic aid for renouncing it. I have no idea; they know better. I know only one thing: The support of the world community is not based on "nuclear criteria."

[Guk] It would interesting to know what the Russian leadership is thinking.

[Savelyev] That is a question that interests the whole world today. Russia's protracted silence can be interpreted unequivocally as actual admission that the "great sharing out" of the nuclear arsenals of the former Union has begun. I understand that Moscow is facing an extremely difficult choice, but a decision can be postponed no longer. Russia, too, must accept its share of the responsibility.

Ukraine Denies Charge

AU0105165592 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 1300 GMT 1 May 92

[Text] The Ukrainian parliament's Commission for Questions of Defense and State Security has refuted the statement by Aleksandr Savelyev, vice president of the Russian Institute of National Security and Strategic Studies, who said in an interview with IZVESTIYA that Ukraine and Kazakhstan are allegedly trying to temporarily privatize their nuclear arsenals.

Serhiy Kolesnyk, member of the Commission for Questions of Defense and State Security of the Ukrainian parliament, quoted quite a number of documents adopted by the Supreme Council and by President Leonid Kravchuk which are aimed at nuclear disarmament.

These are, in particular, the Supreme Council's April resolution on additional measures that enable Ukraine to acquire a nuclear-free status, the agreement between Leonid Kravchuk and Boris Yeltsin on the resumption of the withdrawal from Ukraine of nuclear weapons, and so on.

Ukraine's Denuclearization Offer Viewed

MK3004133092 Moscow KURANTY in Russian
30 Apr 92 p 1

[Article by Mikhail Shchipanov: "In the Labyrinths of the CIS. So Give Kravchuk the Guarantees!"]

[Text] As in the song, L. Kravchuk is haggling, he's asking a higher price. On this occasion, Leonid Makarovich is inviting the West to pay for the complete "denuclearization" of Ukrainian territory by means of security guarantees: What he is saying is that following the removal of the allied nuclear armaments, the republic's defense will be catastrophically weakened to the joy of Russia and other neighbors.

At first glance, the president is seeking yet again to play for time by keeping the missiles in a state of complete uncertainty. It is known that, for Ukraine, the nuclear missiles sited on its territory are no more than a prestigious architectural adornment inasmuch as Kiev will be unable either to make serious use of them or to maintain them in battle-worthy condition. And so no new breaches will appear in Ukrainian defenses following "denuclearization." As far as guarantees are concerned, NATO has already repeatedly let it be understood that it has no intention of revising its strategy and geography either for Budapest or—even less so—for Kiev.

So, just why is Kravchuk again asking "payment" for what he has to sell? Evidently, the cryptocommunist leadership has deemed it best to "internationalize" its conflict with Moscow without waiting to see if international sanctions would really be imposed on Ukraine. The strike was designed as a forestalling move: We are not contemplating anything against the world community, it is saying. Kravchuk's demarche coincided with the appointment of the first Ukrainian ambassador to Washington, so the address of the appeal is clearly marked.

The chief task of the "Kievan lament," however, is to draw a line under the Commonwealth, which Ukraine has long been designating the committee to share out jointly acquired property. Indeed, what sort of alliance is it at all if its formal members regard each other with suspicion by seeking protection from their partners elsewhere. All the latest maneuvers of the Ukrainian leadership are tied up in a fairly compact knot. The conclusion of the agreement with Iran on future deliveries of oil and gas, in order to ease its dependence on Russia. The declaration of Ukraine's desire to act as a bridge between Europe and the Near East. And now the withdrawal of the nuclear weapons must, according to the idea, signify also the rupture of "alliance" ties with the CIS in terms of policy and military organizational development. So there is only the fleet still to be divided up.

Kazakh President to Japanese on Nuclear Policy**To Keep Arms 15 Years***OW0205023492 Tokyo NHK General Television
Network in Japanese 1000 GMT 1 May 92*

[From evening newscast]

[Text] President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, one of former Soviet republics, in an exclusive interview with NHK, said that Kazakhstan would retain strategic nuclear weapons for at least 15 years. In the interview, President Nazarbayev said that Russia—which is to accept and destroy the nuclear weapons—is not ready to accept nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan due to financial and technical reasons. He then said that his country would continue to hold strategic nuclear weapons for at least 15 years until the destruction of the nuclear weapons can be assured.

According to Western data, it is estimated that Kazakhstan holds 1,150 strategic nuclear warheads and 650 tactical nuclear warheads. It has been agreed that all nuclear weapons in the republics, except for Russia, will be placed under joint control and eventually be relinquished to Russia. However in Kazakhstan, there is growing distrust of the Yeltsin administration concerning Russia's moves towards establishing its own army, and strong voices among the parliament and people have expressed the opinion that Kazakhstan should hold its own nuclear weapons. It is believed that the president made such remarks in response to these growing concerns by the parliament and the public, and that his statement reflects Kazakhstan's policy of keeping a close watch on future moves by the Russian Government.

Since the United States is urging Kazakhstan to place its nuclear weapons under Russian control as a precondition for economic assistance, it is most likely that the president's remarks will create a stir in both republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States, as well as other nations.

Meets With Japanese Foreign Minister*LD0205130192 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1145 GMT 2 May 92*

[By KAZTAG correspondent Vladimir Akimov for TASS]

[Text] Alma-Ata, 2 May—Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev and Japanese Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe today discussed ways of expanding and deepening mutually advantageous economic ties. The Japanese diplomat is in the capital of Kazakhstan on a short working visit.

The head of the Japanese Foreign Policy Department informed Nursultan Nazarbayev of Japan's position on

the "northern territories" and voiced anxiety over problems on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, confirming his state's commitment to continue to adhere strictly to the proclaimed principles: not to produce or possess nuclear weapons and not to import them onto its territory.

Nursultan Nazarbayev commented that Kazakhstan did not come into possession of nuclear weapons "of its own accord" and that it is "prepared to join the 1968 nuclear nonproliferation treaty and to seek the complete elimination of nuclear weapons together with other states."

Nursultan Nazarbayev reaffirmed his invitation to Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa to visit Kazakhstan at a time convenient to him.

The Japanese foreign minister left for Moscow the same day.

Discuss Nonproliferation Treaty*OW0205132692 Tokyo KYODO in English
1252 GMT 2 May 92*

[Excerpts] Alma-Ata, May 2 KYODO—Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev said Saturday [2 May] he understands Japan's decades-long call for the return of four Russian-held islands, Japanese officials said. Nazarbayev made the remark in a two-hour meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe shortly after he arrived in Alma-Ata on an eight-day tour of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. [passage omitted]

In other discussions with Nazarbayev, Watanabe called on Kazakhstan to scrap nuclear arsenals deployed in its territory and to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Japanese officials said. Nazarbayev replied that Kazakhstan has no alternative but to continue to possess nuclear weapons, saying he wants Russia, the United States, and China to guarantee the security of Kazakhstan, they said.

Nazarbayev showed a negative stance toward joining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Japanese officials said. Kazakhstan is estimated to possess 10 percent of the nuclear warheads once held by the former Soviet Union.

Nazarbayev said he will tell U.S. President George Bush about the Kazakh security policy when he visits the United States in the middle of May.

Nazarbayev denied a news report that his country contacted Iran about a transfer of nuclear arsenals. [passage omitted]

Further on Nuclear Proliferation*OW0205130592 Tokyo NHK General Television
Network in Japanese 1000 GMT 2 May 92*

[Report by correspondent Eijiro Ishimura in Alma-Ata; from the "NHK News" program—recorded]

[Excerpt] [Announcer] Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe, now visiting the CIS, today met with Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev and called on Kazakhstan to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] as a nonnuclear nation.

[Begin Ishimura recording] Kazakhstan has the second largest land mass in the CIS after Russia, and it is a major Central Asian republic that controls strategic nuclear weapons along with Russia, Ukraine, and Byelarus. Mr. Watanabe became the first Japanese foreign minister to visit Kazakhstan, and he held talks with Mr. Nazarbayev today at the presidential office in Alma-Ata.

Mr. Watanabe told the president that it is important to reduce the number of nuclear powers under the new international order, noting that Japan strongly hopes Kazakhstan joins the NPT as a nonnuclear nation.

Mr. Nazarbayev replied that the Kazakh Government has previously announced that the nation will become a nonnuclear power. He added, however, that it will remain a nuclear power on a temporary basis and will discuss the matter with the United States and other concerned countries. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Byelarus Loses No Prestige Over Weapons Removal

OW0405170992 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1623 GMT 4 May 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A few days ago the last remaining nuclear warheads for operational tactical missiles were removed from Byelarus with the consent of Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich. What has remained of the operational tactical weapons on the republic's territory will apparently be removed by the middle of May.

The leaders of some political organizations have been accusing the Byelarusian government and parliament of being too ready to consent to the removal of nuclear armaments from the republic's territory. Some politicians fear that nobody in the world will take Byelarus seriously if it has all these weapons taken away.

However, Kebich said in one of his speeches that the republic's desire to become a neutral, nuclear-free state did not mean that all nuclear weapons would immediately be withdrawn from Byelarusian territory. All tactical weapons would, he said, be removed before June 1, whereas the withdrawal of strategic arms would take two years. "The Republic of Byelarus will avoid any haste in this matter," he stressed. "This is a lengthy and fairly expensive enterprise. We will be doing the job at the same rate as other countries do."

In an interview with IF [INTERFAX], parliament chairman Stanislav Shushkevich gave his own point of view: "Neutral, nuclear-free Byelarus won't be the backyard of Europe any more than Switzerland is. As the

head of state I will do my best to have all nuclear weapons removed from our territory."

U.S. 'Pressure' on Republics To Drop Nuclear Status Eyed

PM0505094192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
5 May 92 Morning Edition p 1

[Report by Vladimir Mikheyev: "Washington Insists on Nuclear-Free Status for Kiev, Minsk, and Alma-Ata"]

[Text] It has become known from reports leaked to the press that the United States has suggested that the Ukrainian, Byelarus, and Kazakh Governments sign a special protocol making them subjects of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Under the protocol these three republics of the former USSR would pledge, first, never to aspire to the status of nuclear powers and, second, to remove all nuclear weapons from their territory by 1999, when the Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty is finally to be implemented.

The wording of Washington's new proposal is in itself intriguing and makes you wonder whether it is not hardening its positions. According to a report in U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, the official renunciation of any nuclear ambitions (to wit, signing the protocol to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) is required "forthwith." This would entail—in return—"recognition" of the three republics of Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan.

Since the U.S. Administration has already announced that it is establishing full diplomatic relations with Kiev, Minsk, and Alma-Ata, the promise to "recognize" their governments in exchange for their subscribing to the treaty as nuclear-free states can only be attributed to two things. Either it is a misprint on the magazine's part, or concern over the enlarged membership of the "nuclear club" has reached fever pitch in Washington.

Washington is most probably aiming to build up pressure on Kiev, Minsk, and Alma-Ata. It was certainly the main force behind the NATO statement issued the week before last, denying the three republics the right to be termed nuclear states. U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker said at the time: "A United States that hews to the course of isolationism will never be able to ensure its own security." Well-chosen words, but there is a fine line between exhortations and diplomatic pressure. How did this go down in Kiev, Minsk, and Alma-Ata?

Since the foreign policies of these states are still in their formative stages, and the leaderships there need the support of the population and the voters, U.S. pressure will prove effective if the benefits of good relations with that country (humanitarian aid, credits, investments, show of friendship, etc.) outweigh the problems caused by wounded national pride and a "sense of grievance for the country." At present the former does not balance out the latter, which is why Washington will clearly be making additional diplomatic efforts to get its own way.

Further on Ukraine, Byelarus Nuclear Transfer**Ukraine Removes 'Last' of Tactical Arms***OW0605103392 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1006 GMT 6 May 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On the night of May 5, the last lot of nuclear tactical weapons was removed from Ukraine to Russia. The removal was completed 25 days ahead of schedule, Deputy-Head of the CIS Armed Forces' General Department, Lieutenant-General Sergey Zelentsov announced at a press conference on Wednesday [6 May].

He said that last year such weapons had been removed from Byelarus and Kazakhstan. The elimination of tactical nuclear weapons will get under way in four weeks' time, at enterprises of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Power Engineering, and will last till the year 2000. Sergey Zelentsov refused to say where exactly the nuclear weapons brought to Russia from former Union republics are stored, noting that his refusal to do so was motivated by the need to keep these weapons away from terrorists.

Sergey Zelentsov also confirmed that there was no nuclear tactical weapons in the Trans-Caucasia region. They were removed from Trans-Caucasia last year, he said.

Meanwhile, Vadim Dolganov, the press-attache of the Ukrainian mission in the Russian Federation, refused to confirm Sergey Zelentsov's statement to the effect that the withdrawal of nuclear tactical weapons from Ukraine had been completed and referred to his conversation with a representative of the Ukrainian defence ministry. The Ukrainian defence ministry believes, he said, that the withdrawal of the nuclear tactical weapons from Ukraine will be completed according to schedule. He confirmed at the same time that Ukraine will opt for a nuclear-free status. "Ukraine does not intend to have nuclear weapons and would like to make sure that nuclear weapons are not launched from its territory," he said. He also announced that not long ago Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk spoke about the possibility of developing devices blocking the guiding system of missiles which may be launched from Ukrainian territory.

Official 'Cannot Confirm' Report*LD0605105692 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1000 GMT 6 May 92*

[Report by correspondent D. Chukseyev from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] The command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces announced today that Russia is now the only Commonwealth state to possess tactical nuclear weapons. These weapons were withdrawn somewhat earlier from the territory of Byelarus; they were withdrawn from the territory of Ukraine yesterday.

Something of a damper was put on the sensational news by a spokesman of the Ukrainian Embassy in Moscow.

[Begin unidentified Ukrainian press attache recording] Unfortunately, I cannot confirm this report. I talked yesterday with the leadership of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, and from their point of view, I will refrain from saying today that the last tactical nuclear warhead has left the territory of Ukraine. [end recording]

We shall probably find out quite soon about the actual situation. However, the sides were unanimous on one thing: Nothing is hindering the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine; and both sides are striving to ensure that there should be no increase in the number of nuclear states. All the tactical weapons withdrawn from the territory of Ukraine will be destroyed by the year 2000 at enterprises of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy. The remaining plutonium will be used for peaceful purposes. Ukraine will become fully nuclear-free by the end of 1994, when the strategic nuclear weapons of the former USSR will be withdrawn from its territory.

CIS, Ukrainian Aides Comment*LD0605160392 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 1210 GMT 6 May 92*

[Text] The course of the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine was discussed at a news conference in Moscow today. Zelentsov, deputy chief of a Main Directorate of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, and Yakovlev, deputy chief of staff of this same directorate, gave some important information. Dolganov, press attache at the Ukrainian Embassy in Russia, also took part in the news conference.

[Begin recording] [Zelentsov] We have decided today to inform you about the course of the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from the CIS states to Russia. We are striving for the number of nuclear states not to rise but to decrease. With the breakup of the Soviet Union into several independent states a situation emerged in which there were nuclear weapons on the territory of several states rather than one. But now the day has arrived when there are nuclear weapons only on the territory of Russia. There are none on the territory of the other states. They were withdrawn from the territory of Byelarus slightly earlier and they were withdrawn from the territory of Ukraine last night and the process of destruction, as agreed by representatives of Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan, will take place under monitoring by their representatives.

[ITAR-TASS correspondent] ITAR-TASS. It has become known from reliable sources that Ukraine intends to develop a special device allowing it to interfere in the process of controlling [upravleniye] strategic weapons, for example, by blocking a launch. At the same time, Ukraine has stated that it will be a nuclear-free power.

This is a question for the press attache of the Ukrainian Embassy. What are Ukraine's plans regarding strategic weapons?

[Dolganov] Indeed, the talk of Ukraine wanting to have the opportunity to control the nuclear weapons on its territory does have a basis. Literally two days ago, there was a program from Ukraine on the Russian Television channel in which Ukrainian President Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk, in particular, gave an interview. And he said that technically it would be quite possible to make some kind of device to block the launch of missiles. However, it seems to me that it is incorrect to put it that way: that Ukraine is developing or intends to develop some kind of blocking device.

Ukraine announced its nuclear-free status way back in July 1990 when the declaration on the state sovereignty of Ukraine was adopted. This same desire was also confirmed later. It is the aim toward which Ukraine is striving. As far as control is concerned. The temporary suspension of the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine was precisely caused by the fact that Ukraine was unable to say exactly where and how this weaponry was going. Since the accord between the presidents of Ukraine and the Russian Federation, as you know, the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons has been resumed. Of course, it is very pleasant for me to hear today Sergey Aleksandrovich Zelentsov's news that, according to the information of the command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, the last echelon carrying tactical nuclear weapons has crossed the Ukrainian border and I understand that this news could be the sensation of the day, but unfortunately, I am unable to confirm this report.

[Zelentsov] I confirm once again that the nuclear weapons are in the Armed Forces, the Joint Armed Forces. We are responsible for control over them and we know where they are. [end recording]

Munitions Described

PM0705090792 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
7 May 92 Morning Edition pp 1,2

[Report by Viktor Litovkin: "No More Tactical Nuclear Weapons on Ukrainian and Byelorussian Territory. Russia Continues To Destroy Them"]

[Text] Lieutenant General Yevgeniy Maslin, chief of a CIS Joint Armed Forces Main Directorate, told IZVESTIYA that on the night of 5-6 May the last troop train carrying tactical nuclear weapons left Ukraine.

The hush-hush train, which outwardly was virtually no different from ordinary freight and passenger rolling stock, delivered to Russia's prefactory bases [predzavodskiye bazy] for dismantling [razukomplektivaniye] and destruction the last of the thousands of nuclear munitions still remaining on the territory of the independent state after President Leonid Kravchuk suspended the

withdrawal to the Russian Federation agreed under the Alma-Ata and Minsk accords 23 February.

What kind of munitions are they? Aerial bombs for front-line aviation, nuclear antiaircraft missile pods, sea-launched nuclear munitions (torpedo and tactical cruise missile warheads), and air-launched cruise missiles. The same tactical nuclear weapons (apart from sea-launched munitions, of course) have been totally withdrawn from Byelarus. In the last month roughly 200 warheads and bombs have been withdrawn from there.

Thus, Ukraine, Byelarus, and Russia have carried out their commitments in full, a month earlier than scheduled, which is part of our tradition. Now there are tactical nuclear weapons on Russian territory alone. They will be destroyed in accordance with the schedule suggested by then USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev and later clarified and supplemented by Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

We would remind you that the problem with the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory in February was brought about, Leonid Kravchuk said officially, due to the Ukrainian leadership's uncertainty that the nuclear weapons withdrawn from Ukraine to Russia would indeed be dismantled and recycled. The state's officials claimed that lack of reliable supervision of this process from other countries in the CIS and the world community made it unpredictable.

Many independent observers regarded the Ukrainian leadership's nuclear demarches at the time as an attempt to put pressure on Russia when dividing up the Black Sea Fleet and deciding the future of strategic and military-transport aviation and other acute military and political problems. They pointed to the fact that this ad hoc step would hardly change Russia's position at the interstate talks, but might considerably complicate Ukraine's position in the world community and cast doubt on its leaders' ability to carry out international commitments, including the provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

This was what happened. First the Ukrainian president's press service clarified the leadership's position on the question of the tactical nuclear weapons withdrawal, then it was said that the withdrawal would be resumed as soon as Ukraine and Russia secured an agreement on reliable supervision by Kiev.

The agreement was signed by the Russian and Ukrainian presidents in April. Roughly 10 representatives of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry who were previously involved in the maintenance of nuclear munitions supervised the loading of nuclear warheads from their dumps and stores and gave the four trains of special-purpose freight the "green light." Local authorities and public movements, particularly in western parts of Ukraine, picketed the trains, suspecting that military property that the republic's leadership had declared to be the property of the Ukrainian people was being withdrawn from the state.

Independent experts estimate that there are still 176 strategic missile launchers with 1,240 warheads in Ukraine and 54 road-mobile single-warhead missiles [gruntovyye mobilnyye rakety s monoblochnoy boyevoy chastyu].

Byelarus Status Reaffirmed

MK0605130092 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 May 92 p 1

[Pavel Felgengauer report under "CIS" rubric: "There Are No More Tactical Nuclear Warheads in Byelarus. They Will Possibly Be Withdrawn From Ukrainian Territory by 1 July"]

[Text] The CIS High Command and the Russian Government assured your NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent that the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Byelarus was concluded at the beginning of May 1992—two months ahead of the appointed deadline. Now only strategic forces remain on the territory of sovereign Byelarus: 54 launchers for R-12M ground-based [gruntovoy] mobile missiles with single warheads, deployed in the areas of Lida and Mozyr (approximately 20 percent of the total number of such launchers on CIS territory). The withdrawal of the remaining nuclear weapons from the territory of Byelarus is to be concluded by the end of 1994. However, this kind of operation does not present any major technical difficulties—the launchers can (if required) leave under their own power. So it is quite possible that the withdrawal of the strategic forces from Byelarus will also be concluded significantly earlier than the official appointed deadline.

The withdrawal of tactical weapons from Ukraine, previously suspended for two months, is continuing. At the General Staff your NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent was told that it is technically fully possible to conclude the withdrawal by 1 July of this year despite the delay: "We are now catching up with the previously interrupted schedule."

There is every reason to suppose that the world community's disapproval, clearly expressed through diplomatic channels, has after all changed the Kiev leadership's position. Leonid Kravchuk's official visit to Washington began 5 May. The renewed withdrawal of the warheads was presumably one of the basic conditions for the Ukrainian president's invitation by the Americans (and in the future for American money, too).

We can now hope that the tactical nuclear weapons will soon be concentrated on the territory of Russia, where a significant proportion of them will be dismantled. Then the problem of the "new" nuclear powers (Ukraine, Byelarus, Kazakhstan) will in many respects become less acute, since it is immeasurably easier to monitor [kontrolirovat] strategic weapons. The intercontinental range capability (over 10,000 km) of strategic ballistic missiles precludes the possibility of their use in regional conflicts,

and the great weight of the warheads practically precludes other alternative methods of delivery to target. So that if the "new" nuclear powers try to become just that in reality rather than in theory, they will have to essentially start creating a nuclear potential all over again. Furthermore, although components of strategic nuclear weapons deployed outside Russian territory may of course be used in principle, great effort and time would be required for this purpose. And it will scarcely prove possible to keep such a nuclear program (if it is ever started) secret from the world community.

A month ago there was an entirely realistic threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons outside the official "nuclear club" of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Today one can breathe easier and feel somewhat calmer. If the disintegration—long promised by certain politicians and political experts—of the Russian Federation into a number of sovereign (in the nuclear sphere too) states does not start to happen in the near future, the geopolitical balance of forces in Eurasia may again assume the characteristics of permanent [zastoyunny] stability.

'Distortion' by Moscow Alleged

LD0705100692 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in English 0000 GMT 7 May 92

[Text] The Ostankino TV company in Moscow today again distorted information about Ukraine. It informed, in its day program, that to date Ukraine has already fully withdrawn its tactical nuclear weapons to Russia for dismantling. The Moscow journalists referred to the press attache of Ukraine in Moscow, Vadim Dolganov. In reality he did not give any confirmation of the information presented by Ostankino.

During today's briefing in Moscow organized by our embassy and the Press Center of the Foreign Ministry of Russia, Vadim Dolganov pointed out that he has no idea of the official reaction of the Ukrainian leadership to the process of the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from our republic. Therefore, Vadim Dolganov asked to consider the sensation given by Moscow TV a [word indistinct] slander in his address. The leadership of the Ostankino TV promised to publicly apologize to our press attache in Moscow in one of today's information programs.

Ukraine Defense Reports Withdrawal

LD0605194492 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian 1912 GMT 6 May 92

[Report from the press center of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense—read by announcer]

[Text] In accordance with the program announced earlier by Ukraine to remove and destroy tactical nuclear weapons that are situated on the territory of the sovereign state, on the night of 5-6 May the last tactical nuclear devices were removed. In this way Ukraine,

fulfilling the obligations taken upon itself, has fulfilled them ahead of the planned date.

'Contradictions' on Ukraine Withdrawal

*PM0705191192 Moscow IZVESTIYA
in Russian 8 May 92 Morning Edition p 1*

[Report by Viktor Litovkin: "Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine: L. Kravchuk and CIS Joint Armed Forces Command Contradict Each Other"]

[Text] The sharp divergence in official assessments of the completion of the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory has prompted serious concern about the reliability of information that is of critical importance for the fate of our planet.

Russian military men—Lieutenant General Yevgeniy Maslin, chief of a CIS Joint Armed Forces main directorate, and his deputy, Lieutenant General of Aviation Sergey Zelentsov—officially stated 6 May (in an IZVESTIYA article and at a briefing for local and foreign journalists at the Russian Foreign Ministry Press Center, respectively) that all tactical nuclear weapons had been withdrawn from Ukrainian territory. The last military train crossed the border between the states on the night of 5-6 May, and every last warhead and bomb is now at Russian staging [predzavodskiy] bases.

Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, who is on an official visit to Washington, told journalists at a news conference that, under the agreement signed by the Ukrainian and Russian presidents, all tactical nuclear weapons will have been removed from Ukrainian territory only by 1 July, as had been planned. The confusion was brought about by a remark made at a Russian Foreign Ministry briefing by Vadim Dolganov, press secretary at the Ukrainian Embassy in Moscow. He said: "It is still premature to talk about the final withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory."

Who is right? And what actually has happened? Has the Russian side really withdrawn the nuclear weapons in secret, without informing the government and leadership of a sovereign state?

Our correspondent turned for an explanation to Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces.

"All the tactical nuclear weapons previously withdrawn from Byelarus and delivered 6 May from Ukraine, are being held at Russian staging bases," the marshal said. "I have been told that there have been no violations or deviations from plan. I can only speculate as to why Leonid Makarovitch failed to confirm this fact. Most likely he was let down by his aides, who failed to report this event in good time."

We have no grounds for suspecting that any high official is being insincere. There has clearly been a technical error. The agreement gave the date as 1 July. Following the 23 February breakdown of the schedule, it was hard

to get back on track—and who would have suspected that, following their old Bolshevik habits, the Russian military would try to carry out their obligations ahead of schedule.

But, of course, those in a position to do so should brief their leaders in a timely and accurate fashion. This was clearly not done, although the trains carrying the tactical nuclear weapons were loaded, as we have already stated, in the presence of officers from the Ukrainian Defense Ministry and were moved across the state's territory under their supervision.

Incidentally, on Wednesday [6 May] afternoon the Ukrainian Defense Ministry confirmed the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command report that the last tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn from the Republic on the night of 5-6 May. It notes that Ukraine has thus fulfilled its obligation to withdraw tactical nuclear weapons 25 days earlier than planned.

The different official assessments cannot be described as a simple misunderstanding. Whatever political views guided the statesmen, nuclear weapons are too serious a subject for approximate, unverified statements—all the more so when they are being made at such a tense time.

Ukraine, CIS Blame Each Other

*LD0805102192 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0956 GMT 8 May 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Shevtsov]

[Text] Moscow May 8 TASS—Ukraine and CIS Armed Forces command blamed each other on Friday [8 May] for controversial reports on the complete withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine.

The CIS command earlier informed that the last train with Ukrainian nukes left the republic on the night of May 5-6, however, there was no immediate confirmation from the Ukrainian side. It was Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk who confirmed the news at a press conference in Washington on Thursday.

The absence of a coordinating mechanism between the CIS Armed Forces and the Ukrainian Army command was the reason for the confusing reports, Vadim Dolganov, a spokesman for the Ukrainian Embassy in Moscow, told TASS on Friday. "In practice, Ukraine is deprived of a possibility to control nuclear weapons deployed on its territory", he said, adding the CIS Armed Forces command should have informed the Ukrainian leadership on such an important event before making any public statements.

However, a CIS command representative denied the accusations, saying Ukrainian observers monitored the pullout. The withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine was carried out in strict observance of the bilateral agreement of April 16, 1992, Sergey Zelentsov, deputy head of the CIS Armed Forces Main Department, told TASS on Friday. Ukraine appointed special officers

who controlled the pullout, the details of which had been agreed with the Ukrainian Defence Ministry, he said, adding the ministry was aware the last train with tactical nuclear weapons had left for Russia.

"Ukrainian leaders have to find out the reason why their Defence Ministry had not timely forwarded the information to the government", Zelentsov said.

Kravchuk 'Did Not Know Everything'

PM0805132592 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 8 May 92 p 3

[Report by K. Belyaninov: "Kravchuk Probably Did Not Know Everything"]

[Text] During the night of 5-6 May Russia and Ukraine almost quarreled again. The last train carrying tactical nuclear weapons crossed the border between the states at 0130 hours. Ten hours later a spokesman for the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command declared quite officially that tactical charges no longer exist on the territory of Ukraine and Byelarus, the Alma-Ata and Minsk agreements have been fulfilled one month ahead of schedule, and these weapons will now be destroyed on Russian territory under the control of representatives of the four republics. A few hours later Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, paying an official visit to the United States, refuted that information and told the amazed public that it is not yet possible to speak of the final withdrawal of weapons from Ukraine.

"Maybe Kravchuk simply did not have the information," Major General Vitaliy Yakovlev, spokesman for a CIS Joint Armed Forces main directorate, believes. "He flew to the United States on the morning of 5 May, but the removal of the weapons was completed almost 24 hours later. All the work of loading the munitions was carried out under the control of representatives of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry, who ensured that our trains reached the republic's borders."

According to Vitaliy Yakovlev, anti-aircraft missile warheads, aerial bombs for front-line aircraft, torpedo and sea-launched cruise missile warheads, nuclear landmines, and artillery shell warheads that were stationed on the territory of Ukraine and Byelarus have been removed to Russian territory.

For almost 24 hours the Defense Ministry and the government maintained a restrained silence, preferring not to make any comment at all on the CIS Joint Armed Forces' report, while Maj. Gen. Konstantin Morozov, the republic's defense minister, even declared in a BBC TV interview that the words of "Moscow's representatives" should not be taken too literally. Ukraine's representatives were able to clarify matters only toward the end of yesterday:

"We have just received a Defense Ministry coded message and can state quite officially that there are no tactical nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory,"

Aleksandr Tarasenko, secretary of the Supreme Soviet Commission for Defense and Security Questions, reported.

People in the republic's parliament preferred not to expand upon the reasons which prompted President Kravchuk to make a rather incautious statement, merely remarking that "not even the president can know everything."

Ukraine's Kravchuk Visits Washington

Discusses START With Bush

LD0605173992 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1556 GMT 6 May 92

[By UKRINFORM correspondents Viktor Demidenko and Igor Barsukov for ITAR-TASS]

[Text] Washington, 6 May—Talks began this morning at the White House between U.S. President George Bush and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, who arrived here on Tuesday [5 May] on an official visit. The leaders of the two countries met one on one to start with and then the talks were continued with an expanded composition.

Answering correspondents' questions during a brief ceremony for photographs to be taken before the start of the meeting with G. Bush, L. Kravchuk said that all problems connected with implementing the treaty on cuts to strategic offensive weapons will be resolved. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and I are discussing problems connected with the treaty and "if any questions remain, we will discuss them today", stated L. Kravchuk. On Tuesday the Ukrainian president noted that he did not see substantial differences between the position of his country and that of the United States on the question of reducing nuclear weapons.

After completing the meeting in the White House, G. Bush and L. Kravchuk will sign American-Ukrainian documents which envisage expanding cooperation between the two countries in the sphere of trade, environmental protection, and other spheres.

Holds News Conference

LD0705032192 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 2200 GMT 6 May 92

[Report by UKRINFORM-ITAR-TASS correspondents Viktor Demidenko and Igor Barsukov]

[Excerpts] Washington, 7 May—At the White House on Wednesday [6 May], talks took place between U.S. President George Bush and Ukraine's President Leonid Kravchuk, who is here on an official visit. [passage omitted]

Replying to journalists' questions, the head of the Ukrainian state said that, in accordance with the agreement

signed between the presidents of Ukraine and Russia, all tactical nuclear weapons will be removed from Ukrainian territory by 1 July as planned. L. Kravchuk reported that the Ukrainian minister of foreign affairs and the U.S. secretary of state have held lengthy discussions on the problems connected with ratification of the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Weapons. In his words, the basic problems between the U.S. and Ukraine have been settled. And as soon as the protocol that envisages measures for the implementation of the agreement on strategic offensive weapons is signed, "Ukraine will ratify the treaty on strategic offensive weapons and will fulfill all its obligations arising from this agreement." [passage omitted]

President Kravchuk repeated that Ukraine intended to continue to adhere to the policy of eliminating the nuclear weapons on its territory. But he pointed out that there existed a security problem for Ukraine, since in some neighboring countries, and especially in a country as large as Russia, there were political forces that "would like to make territorial claims against Ukraine, and that certainly disturbs us." We will do everything in our power to settle possible conflicts with Russia, but these problems will exist, since the empire has collapsed, and people have different interests. L. Kravchuk also voiced the hope that the international community would play its part in providing "some guarantees of Ukraine's national sovereignty in the event of a possible threat." [passage omitted]

U.S. Concerns Viewed

PM0705141192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
7 May 92 Morning Edition pp 1,7

[Aleksandr Shalnev report: "L. Kravchuk Discusses Russo-Ukrainian Relations in Washington"]

[Text] Ukrainian diplomats did not invite anyone from the Russian Embassy to the opening of their embassy in Washington, even though the embassies are just five minutes' walk apart.

Presumably they did not do this without consultations with Kiev and, I believe, with President Kravchuk himself, who arrived in the United States Tuesday [6 May] for a visit in which the first item on the agenda was the ceremonial opening of the embassy, where Secretary of State James Baker was another guest of honor.

This casual diplomatic snub to Russia—it is difficult to view Kiev's "forgetfulness" any other way—was given at a time when Washington is urgently appealing to Ukraine to establish and maintain good relations with Russia.

This indeed was stated several hours before Kravchuk's arrival in Washington by a high-ranking White House National Security Council [NSC] staffer. I cannot give his name, I can only note that he plays a leading role in defining U.S. policy toward the countries of the former Union. Kiev recently hinted quite transparently that it

wants security guarantees from the West and from the United States in particular—in conditions in which it will have to renounce its own nuclear weapons. According to the NSC staffer, "the best guarantees are the rapid and close integration of Ukraine with world institutions, fast economic reforms, the development and strengthening of democracy, and good relations with Russia. These are far more reliable guarantees of security," my interlocutor stressed, "than a scrap of paper."

But as you can understand, the "scrap of paper" will surface at the talks that the Ukrainian leader will hold in Washington with President Bush, Vice President Quayle, Defense Secretary Cheney, Secretary of State Baker, and Commerce Secretary Franklin. Judging by comments from high-ranking representatives of the White House and other federal departments, Washington would clearly like to give priority in the conversations with the Ukrainian leader to problems connected with nuclear weapons, first and foremost the withdrawal of warheads from Ukrainian territory and the ratification of the Soviet-U.S. START treaty. The administration is not even trying to hide its dissatisfaction that solutions have not been found to these problems yet although, as was stated at the White House Tuesday, "considerable progress has been made in the past few weeks." Assistant Secretary of State Margaret Tutwiler hinted very clearly on Tuesday that it is the administration's belief that the promises given to Washington in December, when Baker met with the leaders of Ukraine and Kazakhstan, are not being kept in full.

It seems to me that during the visit it will be made quite clear to Leonid Kravchuk that there is a dependence between how Kiev resolves nuclear questions with Moscow and how active the United States will be in giving economic and financial aid to Ukraine. At the moment Washington is in no hurry to open its coffers or those of the IMF wide for Ukraine's benefit. This is due not just to political reasons. According to the anonymous NSC staffer, "economic reforms in Ukraine are developing far slower than in Russia. It has to be asked: Does Kiev have a precise economic plan which it would make sense to help?"

On the other hand, the United States is prepared to give Ukraine technical help. It is proposed that agreements on this score be concluded during the visit. According to some information, an agreement will also be signed whereby the United States will give Ukraine most-favored trading status.

The administration is conducting a thorough discussion with Leonid Kravchuk on the Black Sea Fleet and the Crimea. As the White House said on Tuesday, "we want good relations between Ukraine and Russia so that these countries develop a mechanism for resolving the difficulties emerging between them... It is not so much the Black Sea Fleet as the Crimea which is the major source of tension. It will take time to resolve this problem. We

believe that this can be done, but there will not be improvements and successes every day on the path toward this goal."

Visit Allays U.S. Nuclear Concerns

*PM0705191592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
8 May 92 Morning Edition p 5*

[Aleksandr Shalnev report: "L. Kravchuk States That Tactical Nuclear Weapons Have Still Not Been Withdrawn From Ukraine"]

[Text] Washington—Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk confirmed Wednesday [6 May] that tactical nuclear weapons will be withdrawn from Ukrainian territory by the start of July, thereby refuting statements made in Moscow to the effect that these weapons already had been withdrawn.

In a conversation with reporters during and after a White House meeting with U.S. President George Bush, the Ukrainian leader also announced that Kiev is prepared to sign a protocol to the Soviet-U.S. START Treaty and to subsequently ratify the treaty itself. Moreover, Kravchuk, the U.S. President said, had assured the White House that Ukraine would accede to the Nonproliferation Treaty.

Judging by all these statements, Kravchuk virtually has removed at one fell swoop some of Washington's key questions about Kiev's disarmament intentions. Insofar as I understand it, the idea suggested a few weeks ago by Secretary of State James Baker of a protocol to the START Treaty is aimed at "legitimizing" the involvement of Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan—along with Russia, of course—in the Soviet legal legacy and correspondingly accelerating ratification of the treaty. Without strict guarantees that the treaty will be recognized and ratified by the four nuclear republics of the former Union, Washington was disinclined to, as it were, unilaterally ratify the document itself. Secretary of State Baker has for several months now been delaying the commencement of the process of hearings in the Senate committees and subcommittees which will decide the legislative fate of the treaty.

In removing some acute issues, Kravchuk, as a CBS radio commentator put it, gave the United States a "surprise gift." The United States was not slow to respond. As can be judged from Bush's statements to reporters, Washington is now prepared to deal more actively with questions of aid to Ukraine. And this readiness even goes beyond the framework of the agreements outlined by Washington and Kiev before the visit and signed during it.

If in the weeks to come Washington is convinced of the seriousness of the promises and pledges made by Kravchuk on nuclear problems, the administration will be inclined to revise its own, so far highly skeptical, position on large-scale economic and financial aid to Kiev.

Nuclear problems are not the only problems worrying the administration in its assessments of Kiev's policy. Concern also has been expressed about relations between Ukraine and Russia. Kravchuk has been in no rush to dispel this concern. On the contrary, his public statements have tended to confirm the view that the situation is very complex and could become even more so. In particular, the Ukrainian president sharply assailed Russian Vice President Rutskoy, whose statements in the Crimea the Kiev leader called "very dangerous and politically unfounded." He also said—in the context of his statements on Rutskoy—that beyond the borders of Ukraine, "there are forces stimulating, whipping up, and financing separatist sentiments."

Reaffirms Nuclear Weapons Policy

*LD0705181992 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0745 GMT 7 May 92*

[By UKRINFORM-ITAR-TASS correspondents Viktor Demidenko and Igor Barsukov]

[Text] Washington, 7 May—Talks between U.S. President George Bush and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, on an official visit here, took place in the White House Wednesday [6 May]. At the end of the talks the heads of the two countries signed agreements envisaging the development of cooperation between the United States and Ukraine in the field of commerce, the protection of foreign investments and the protection of the environment, as well as an agreement on implementing a program of the United States Peace Corps in Ukraine.

The United States and Ukrainian presidents highly assessed the results of the meeting at a news conference later at the White House. We had intensive and successful talks and agreed that the United States and Ukraine ought to be not just friends but partners, George Bush stated. He welcomed Ukraine's readiness to completely give up nuclear weapons which was confirmed by President Kravchuk.

For his part, Kravchuk, replying to journalists' questions, stressed that in accordance with the agreement signed by the Ukrainian and Russian presidents all tactical nuclear weapons would be removed from Ukrainian territory by 1 July, as planned.

The president told journalists that the Ukrainian foreign affairs minister and the United States Secretary of State discussed in detail the problems of the ratification of the treaty on limiting and reducing strategic offensive weapons and reached a mutual understanding in this respect. As soon as the protocol, envisaging measures directed at its implementation, is signed, Kravchuk said, "Ukraine will ratify the treaty on strategic offensive weapons and will meet all obligations it implies".

I think that we made headway in the tackling of this problem, the United States President noted. The state of affairs regarding the treaty "is not in a bad condition".

But these issues should be also settled with other CIS countries which have nuclear weapons on their territory. Secretary of State James Baker continues to deal with this matter.

President Kravchuk pointed out that the problem of security exists for the Ukraine because in certain neighboring countries, particularly in such a large country as Russia, there are political forces "who would like to make territorial claims on Ukraine and this naturally disturbs us". We are doing everything in our power to settle any potential conflicts with Russia, he said, at the same time expressing the hope that the international community will play its role in ensuring "guarantees of Ukraine's national security in the event of a possible threat".

The two leaders emphasized the importance of cooperation in the economic sphere. The United States intends to assist the Ukraine's development toward economic prosperity in a free market system, the head of the White House stated. He said that the United States will continue to carry out a program of technical assistance to Ukraine and offer it guarantees on credits totalling 110 million dollars.

Bush also reported that he intends in the near future to grant Ukraine the status of most-favored nation in trade. The Ukrainian president noted the importance of the agreements signed with the United States in the economic field and stressed that his country is not assuming the role of a suppliant, but is interested in cooperation with the United States in order to switch more quickly to a market economy.

Meetings were also held on the same day between the Ukrainian president and the United States secretaries of commerce, defense and treasury. Kravchuk made a short trip with Bush to Camp David and met with United States Vice President Dan Quayle and Baker. In the evening a reception in honor of the Ukrainian president was held in the United States Congress.

Kravchuk on Black Sea, START Treaty

*LD0805071892 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0627 GMT 8 May 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yuriy Kirilchenko]

[Text] New York May 8 TASS—Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk said in an interview with the U.S. Cable News Network on Thursday [7 May] that all tactical weapons, except in the Black Sea Fleet, have been removed from Ukraine.

"I can't tell you exactly when these weapons will be removed. We want the Black Sea Fleet to be free from nuclear weapons and the Black Sea to be a sea of cooperation and a nuclear-free zone," Kravchuk said.

The Ukrainian leader stressed there is no possibility to remove all nuclear weapons from Ukraine by 1994 as the

four nuclear republics of the former Soviet Union agreed. He added, however, Ukraine will sign the U.S.-Soviet START Treaty.

Under the treaty, strategic offensive weapons should be destroyed within seven years. "We could do that faster but certain organisational and financial measures should be taken first," Kravchuk said, expressing hope that "the world community and the United States will help us both materially and organisationally."

Speaking on the situation in the Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet, Kravchuk said: "I think the Black Sea Fleet problem could be solved only through negotiations and agreements." "As for the Crimea—it is Ukraine's internal affair."

Kravchuk said the transfer of the Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 was fair, adding that Ukraine "does not accept territorial claims because they lead to instability and confrontation."

Kozyrev Assures Germans on Nuclear Weapons

'Main Concern' for Germany

*LD0705124492 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1207 GMT 7 May 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Aleksandr Krivykh and Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Strasbourg May 7 TASS—The Russian and German foreign ministers discussed at their latest meeting the problem of control over nuclear armaments of the former USSR and the situation in the new Commonwealth.

The main concern for all now, including Germany, is the nuclear weapons problem, specifically, Russia's talks with Kazakhstan, Byelarus and Ukraine about their joining the CIS treaty as non-nuclear states, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev told ITAR-TASS. Naturally, they all discussed with Genscher the domestic situation in Germany, Russia and the new Commonwealth in general, he pointed out.

"We, Genscher and myself, have long maintained the relations of confidence. This is why it was very important for me to discuss the latest developments with him in an unofficial way," Kozyrev said. It was important for one more reason: These are the last days of Genscher on the post of German foreign minister. He, the doyen foreign minister, is a man of enormous experience and knowledge, Kozyrev stressed.

Further Report

*LD0705101692 Berlin ADN in German
0953 GMT 7 May 92*

[Text] Strasbourg (ADN)—FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Free Democratic Party) has again

appealed to the successor states to the Soviet Union to agree on the division of the disarmament quota.

At a meeting with his Russian counterpart Andrey Kozyrev on the sidelines of the 90th session of the ministerial committee of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg today, Genscher also stressed the continuity of German

foreign policy after his departure from office. That will be true of German-Russian relations in particular, he said.

Foreign Minister Kozyrev is confident that an agreement on the disarmament quota can be reached between the new republics before the summit meeting of the CSCE member nations in Helsinki. He also gave the assurance that all tactical nuclear weapons are deployed on Russian territory and are under control.

FINLAND

Premier 'Concerned' Over Russian Troop Buildup

LD0505220192 Stockholm Radio Sweden in English
2100 GMT 5 May 92

[Text] In Nordic news, Finland's Prime Minister Esko Aho says he is concerned over Russian military deployments close to his country. He has called for talks on the issue and said he hoped it can be discussed at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe or CSCE. Russian troops have been building up across the border from Finland, mainly due to the withdrawal from former Soviet bases in central Europe. Aho also called for the speedy removal of Russian troops from the Baltic republics.

FRANCE

Chief of Staff Cited on Nuclear Test Suspension

92ES0758A Paris LE MONDE in French
22 Apr 92 p 32

[Article entitled: "Admiral Lanxade Cites the Military's 'Many Questions' About the Suspension of Nuclear Testing"]

[Text] In a message to the armed forces, Admiral Jacques Lanxade sought to reassure "all personnel who work to create or implement our nuclear forces" that Mr. Mitterand's decision to suspend 1992's nuclear tests was temporary. It was the first time that Admiral Lanxade had echoed the many questions that the president's initiative has raised. In his message, the armed forces chief of staff was careful to explain that the decision was a political one, and to avoid any mention of a possible military interest. On the contrary, he said, carefully picking his words in the official message: "We must maintain the capabilities needed to resume the tests when the suspension decided on by the government is over. This temporary halting of our tests, is one of many unilateral measures that France has taken and that testify to our policy of restraint in the matter of nuclear weapons. If this signal were not understood, if the example were not followed, then clearly the suspension would not be extended" beyond 1992. Suspension of the four tests scheduled in Polynesia was announced by the prime minister (see LE MONDE 10 and 16 April), but was not preceded by in-depth consultation with the different general staffs. The United States and the People's Republic of China have since announced they would continue their experiments. Only Russia is continuing the moratorium it began in 1990.

But sources close to British intelligence recently hinted that Mr. Yeltsin had signed a secret decree 23 February regarding the possible resumption of testing on an Arctic island next October.

Regional Impact of Military Restructuring Viewed

Lorient Naval Base

92ES0735A Paris LE MONDE in French
26-27 Apr 92 p 9

[Article by Michel Le Hebel: "Lorient Keeps a Cool Head"]

[Text] In 1993, some 100 military bases will either be eliminated, relocated, or reorganized as part of a reorganization of the Armed Forces decided upon by the government. As early as this year, the effort will involve 75 other sites. From 1994 to 1996, military sites and property will undergo a similar overhaul. In principle, working through a Delegation for Reorganization, the Ministry of Defense intends to combine its program with proposed conversion solutions for the communes affected. However, local officials, who had nothing to do with the decision, are already searching for ways to compensate for the negative effects of the plan. Such is the case of the coastal areas of Contentin and Brittany, but also the eastern border regions.

Vannes—There are no predictions of dire gloom in this city with five ports, even though the impact of Joxe's plan on the shipyards and navy is substantial: the loss of 200 jobs at the shipyards (out of a total 3,100), 110 of these through natural attrition, and 300 in the navy (involving 154 career military personnel). Lorient can seek consolation in the fact that Cherbourg is paying the heaviest price. Having just "landed" from Rue Royale, Jean-Yves Le Drian, former secretary of state for the navy and now mayor (PS [Socialist Party]) of Lorient, "in no way underestimates (the Joxe Plan), but will not dramatize its consequences."

For the navy in Lorient, the measures are fourfold: The 90 men of the amphibious group will leave Lorient for Toulon in mid 1993. The forward operational base made up of four navy commandos (70 men) will simply disappear. The "Champlain," a light transport ship based at Lorient with a crew of 50 and now on a mission in the Antilles, is now assigned to Toulon. By 1994, the home port for two patrol vessels: the "Sterne" and the "Grebe," with a total crew of 72 and responsible for overseeing fishing and public service missions, will be Brest.

More disturbing is the uncertainty affecting the conventionally propelled attack submarine base where 700 men are stationed, half of them technical personnel. Construction work will begin at Brest in 1993 in order, "when the time comes," to accommodate the four "Agosta" class diesel submarines to be used after the year 2000. This prospect roused so great of an emotional reaction at the German built Keroman base that the navy staff was forced to issue a statement to the effect that the measure was indeed under study, but that nothing had yet been decided.

Shipyards and the Contract of the Century

While he views the navy's losses at Lorient as "annoying," the former secretary of state has no real fears about the future of the Lorient shipyards, "which have found their salvation," mainly in the form of a stunning contract to build six frigates for Taiwan. Totalling 14 billion francs and amounting to 1.5 million hours of work for each vessel, it will have a major spinoff effect for subcontractors over the five year period: 400 new jobs in 1992 and another 250 in 1993. Goodwill Ambassador Le Drian plans to launch a Brittany-Taiwan friendship association.

Will the Lorient Naval Shipyards Administration (DCN) be able to survive on exports alone? On 13 June, the first of three "La Fayette" class frigates will go into service for the French Navy. The first elements of the second frigate, the "Surcouf," are being assembled. With regular maintenance of the French fleet and the Taiwan frigates, the Lorient DCN has 4.8 million man hours on its schedule for 1992. It also has an order for three mine sweepers for Pakistan. The first, the "Sagittaire," will be taken from the navy's reserve. A second and perhaps a third should be built at Lorient. The city of Lorient also expects a great deal from a new contract with Saudi Arabia: warships, three of which were built at La Seyne (Var) based on a prototype designed at Lorient. Finally, the DCN has begun studies for the French-British anti-aircraft frigate whose construction will be a joint venture of the two countries.

"The shipyard schedule and industrial capacity of Lorient have been completely restored. This cannot be overemphasized, enough. To suddenly take in nine orders for ships is unheard-of here, in contrast with Saint-Nazaire, where one order for a liner results in an enthusiastic announcement," Le Drian observes, admitting that "the capacity for export is a strength as well as a weakness." As for the reconversion plan which he intends to propose for his city, he hopes "it will be accepted by the shipyards as a way of injecting new strength into the industrial fabric of Lorient."

Alsace Affected

92ES0735B Paris LE MONDE in French
26-27 Apr 92 p 9

[Article by Marcel Scotto: "Alsace Hard Hit"]

[Text] Strasbourg—Between now and 1994, 4,600 fewer military men will be stationed in a region currently home to some 12,100. These are the gross figures to come out of the Joxe Plan affecting northeastern France. Alsatian politicians of all parties would therefore have good reason to speak of "heavy hitting" or even "deliberate heavy hitting."

Lorraine should view itself as less affected by the armed forces' redeployment program. Only the related military supplies center at Verdun and the Ressaincourt munitions depot (30 km south of Metz) will be eliminated.

The most significant decision concerns the merger of the Phalsbourg 6th Artillery Regiment with the Nevers 7th Artillery Regiment, meaning the departure of 250 persons. In contrast, the Moselle compound of 5,000 inhabitants will have an increase in Ground Forces Tactical Air Support (ALAT) personnel. The creation of a staff for the Central European Inter-Armed Forces Group has not been ruled out.

In Franche-Comte, the only scheduled dissolution is that of the Héricourt mobilization center (Haute-Saône) affecting but a limited number of "jobs" (74 soldiers and nine civilians). The rest will be a matter of the reorganization of regional materiel centers (ERM) like those at Belfort and Besançon.

Comparatively speaking, Alsace seems to be the real target of the Ministry of Defense. The Strasbourg-Entzheim Air Base (2,000 men) is scheduled to be closed in 1994 (see below) and the 153d Infantry Regiment at Mutzig (1,450) should be eliminated in 1993, along with the 57th Signals Regiment at Mulhouse (860) and the 8th Hassars at Altkirch (800).

Other measures do not in themselves involve significant numbers, but their combined effect is substantial. Under such conditions, one can understand the distress of certain Alsatian elected officials. Jean-Luc Reitzer (RPR), mayor of Altkirch and deputy from Haut-Rhin, speaks of "mourning" in his commune. The members of the 8th Hassars comprise 20 percent of the population of this southern Alsatian city. Mulhouse Mayor and Deputy Jean-Marie Bockel (PS) supports his Haut-Rhin colleagues, while admitting that the elimination of units is "the result of a policy one can understand."

Nevertheless, the elimination of the 57th Signals Regiment is bound to have an economic impact. According to the regiment's commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Gutekunst, the pay of the 300 officers and noncommissioned officers in his unit amount to a total of some 2 million francs a month. All military personnel rent housing in Mulhouse and nearby communes. However, Bockel is pleased to say that he has already "looked to the future" and is thinking about negotiating auxiliary measures and even replacements with the government. His optimistic nature causes him to say: "I have hopes for something in Mulhouse or Haut-Rhin, perhaps an element of the future European Army Corps."

Metzig Out on Top

Actually, of all the Alsatian communes, the only one to come out on top and even reap more substantial profits than at present is Mutzig. The infantry regiment will be replaced by the 44th Signals Regiment (1,200 men) now based in Landau (Germany). However, a technical regiment has more officers (a third of all personnel) than does an infantry unit, which has more enlisted men. André Courtes (United France), the first judge in this settlement of 5,300, has difficulty concealing his satisfaction: "It is true that I am not weeping over my fate."

For this native Parisian who has served as mayor since 1981, it is the revenge he had awaited since Heineken, owner of the famous brand since 1975, closed the brewery in 1990. "It is difficult to imagine what a blow we suffered when they halted production of an establishment that had provided 25 percent of all municipal revenue and 50 percent of the professional tax proceeds," he recalls. He says that for the past two years, he has been aware of changes ahead for Mutzig. He therefore moved very quickly (visibly rousing serious reluctance on the part of the more cautious) to plan structures to accommodate the additional officers who would be coming to live within Mutzig's walls. He is candid about the fact that the city will join with private interests to build "a very fine housing complex of 200 to 400 units by 1994."

Strasbourg Air Base

92ES0735C Paris LE MONDE in French
26-27 Apr 92 p 9

[Article by Jacques Fortier: "End of Cohabitation at Strasbourg-Entzheim"]

[Text] The scheduled closing of the Strasbourg-Entzheim Air Base in the summer of 1994 and the transfer to Reims of the 33d Reconnaissance Squadron have roused great emotion in Alsace. It will mean the actual departure of an enterprise involving nearly 2,000 persons, including some 50 civilians, located in the area of the air base since 1959. Above all, it sounds the death knell for shared civilian and military use of the airport's only runway, which had its positive aspects.

The "divorce" will force the Chamber of Commerce to take over security and fire services, runway maintenance and lighting systems, and snow and ice clearance in the wintertime, services now performed by military personnel. "We are not yet able to provide the figures, but it will be a big undertaking for us," warns Director Veit of the Strasbourg Airport, which is managed by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The Chamber of Commerce currently pays the Air Force 3 million francs a year and certain facilities, such as all-weather landing elements, have been cofinanced. Civilian air controllers will also have to replace military personnel in their current functions.

The move is to be completed in 1994 and must be very gradual, base officials explain. One question nevertheless remains unanswered: "Will the air force give back all or part of the facilities and on what terms?" Veit asks. Development of the Strasbourg International Airport may be largely modified by them. So far, every phase has been the object of intense negotiations between civilians and the military. For example, new underground parking lots had to be built, but the air force agreed to expand tie-down areas for civilian planes at its expense.

The Bas-Rhin General Council protested "measures taken without previous consultation or information (...)

which seriously challenge Strasbourg's role as the European capital." Taking a more moderate tack, Catherine Trautmann, Socialist mayor of Strasbourg, wrote to the minister of defense challenging "the logic that would take away from Alsace and Strasbourg armed forces personnel stationed there."¹ Actually, Strasbourg hopes to host the joint staff and perhaps command and support regiment of the future French-German army corps, which could give the Alsatian capital a new military role.

Footnote

¹The head of the Armed Forces Information and Public Relations Service (SIRPA), Armed Forces Comptroller General Gerard Delbauffe, said he was "surprised" at the emotion roused by the closing of the Strasbourg base and particularly remarks made by its mayor, who "recently complained of nuisances created by soldiers and demanded that they leave the region."

Reaction at Cherbourg

92ES0735D Paris LE MONDE in French
26-27 Apr 92 p 9

[Text] Cherbourg—Minister of Defense Pierre Joxe's announcement of the dissolution of the Nord fleet in the summer of 1993 will cause Cherbourg to lose its status as an operational military port. At the same time, without awaiting the military budget, 100,000 working hours will be lost in the months ahead by subcontractors for the Naval Shipyards Directorate (DCN) even before the elimination of 240 jobs in 1993.

"It is out of the question to accept such decisions," trumpeted Cherbourg Mayor Jean-Pierre Godefroy (Socialist), ready to engage in "fratricidal battle" with the government. Moreover, the battle was on when the urban commune's elected officials of all parties protested at the subprefecture on the weekend of 21-22 April.

Above and beyond the actual shipyards, it is the future of the entire Cherbourg basin of jobs that is at stake. The CIT-Alcatel plant is drafting its fourth social program: The future of the Normandy Machine Construction plant, "shipyards of the stars," is still very much in question and La Hague is going through the painful post-major shipyards period. Between now and July, some 1,500 jobs will disappear from a region that already has an unemployment rate of 14 percent.

"The situation is intolerable," warns Bernard Cauvin, Socialist deputy from La Manche. Waiting in vain for four months for a meeting with Matignon, the elected officials of the urban community were finally seen by Pierre Beregovoy on 23 April. They presented their proposed measures to the prime minister aimed at opening up the region and outlining action on housing, training, and the creation of new enterprises. They had expected to obtain compensation for the loss of jobs tied to the end of construction at the La Hague shipyards, "but only the prime minister holds the key to the

initiation of interministerial negotiations aimed at revitalizing Nord-Cotentin," Cauvin said. (Interim)

Picardy Studied

92ES0735E Paris LE MONDE in French
26-27 Apr 92 p 1

[Text] Working directly under the authority of the prefect of Aisne, a special representative of the Ministry of Defense will be installed in Laon before 15 May for the purpose of personally seeking economic solutions to make up for the withdrawal of military personnel from Picardy following the dissolution of its infantry division. A departmental committee will also be set up to study the demands of local officials. This announcement was made in Laon on Friday, 24 April, by Secretary of State for Defense Jacques Mellick, special envoy to the region.

With the disappearance of the 8th Infantry Division (LE MONDE, 16 April), Picardy is by far the region hardest hit by military reorganization measures announced by the minister of defense in mid-April and affecting some 22,000 men (army, air force, and gendarmerie). Related employment amounts to 15,000 active jobs, roughly 2 percent of the active population, and the Picardy Regional Council estimates the armed forces will spend some 1.3 billion francs [Fr] in a region where the unemployment rate is 10.1 percent.

Aisne may receive financial aid from the defense reorganization fund, whose 1992 allocation amounted to Fr80 million. "It is a paltry sum," Mellick admitted, "but it will enable us to complete studies" and, if need be, seek other sources of financing.

GERMANY

Impact of Canadian Force Withdrawal Assessed

92GE0327A Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 18 Apr 92 p 10

[Article by Karl Feldmeyer: "Farewell to Europe by Late 1994: Canadian NATO Contingent Preparing for Withdrawal From Germany"]

[Text] The end of the East-West conflict makes it possible for NATO member countries to reduce their defensive efforts and to cut back their armed forces. The end of the Cold War results in even more for the Canadian Forces, however: Nearly total withdrawal from Europe, and, simultaneously, from the role it has hitherto played within the alliance. By the end of 1994, that is, over the next 19 months, approximately 18,000 Canadians, military personnel as well as civilians, will leave Germany. They are stationed in Baden Soellingen and Lahr.

Germany was the focal point of Canada's military involvement in Europe since Canadian forces had been transferred there from France in 1951. A brigade, a division staff, and a squadron of the Canadian Air Force with 54 CF-18 planes that operate out of Lahr formed

the core of the Canadian contingent in Germany. In a grave situation, an additional brigade from Quebec would have been added. That means Canada would have provided half of its Army units to defend Germany, since that large country has no more than four brigades at its disposal; its total armed forces amount to just 80,000 men.

Since the Canadian government decided in February to cut its defense budget by \$2.2 million [Canadian dollars] by 1997, the Canadian Army will be reduced to three brigades, and the Canadian Air Force will be reduced from five squadrons to four. From 1995 onward, they will all be stationed in Canada. Only 133 Canadian soldiers will remain in Germany. They will constitute the Canadian share of the NATO Airborne Warning and Control System [AWACS] unit, stationed in Geilenkirchen, which is equipped with 18 Boeing 707 aircraft. Their radar dome, a circular plate attached above the fuselage, makes it possible to detect movements in the air and on the ground from a distance in excess of 500 km.

The fact that the Canadian Forces, in the four decades in which they have been guests in Germany, were never the focus of greater attention stems not only from their modest numbers, when compared with those of the troops from the United States, but also from the fact that their conduct never provided any cause for complaint. They never posed a problem for public safety officials. NATO knew the value of this small but superbly trained and equipped, highly-motivated fighting force. They constituted a part of the reserve of NATO Supreme Command, Central Europe, and, as such, they participated in the most important mission the alliance had as long as the division of Germany and Europe lasted, namely front-line defense. The Canadians would have stood at the point where a breakthrough would have threatened. They have now been relieved of that task. Now they are the first to reap the consequences of a complete withdrawal from the new situation. In doing so, they create a precedent. Of that NATO officials are certain, particularly since no one knows what effect the Canadian example will have on the United States and its public opinion.

The question as to Canada's future role within the alliance is one that cannot yet be answered. The new situation the alliance sees itself confronting does not make it possible to work out a concrete strategic concept, as was the case, for example, with the "flexible response" and its attendant front line of defense. Not only is the future deployment concept of NATO unclear; so, too, is the question of the nuclear role of the United States within Europe, which is an important one for the Canadians. Until the end of the Cold War, the guiding principle was one of nuclear deterrence (extended deterrence) through United States atomic weaponry potential. The decision rested with the President of the United States, yet the authorization procedures, the use criteria, the attendant threatening scenarios, and potential target planning were worked out in detail within NATO, in the

Nuclear Planning Group and its committees. The "general political guidelines" contained detailed stipulations. What will remain of all that must still be clarified, as must the question, to what extent a Western European Union (WEU), which wants to be more than an organ of NATO, will change United States willingness to assume nuclear risks for Europe.

These are unknowns insofar as NATO's future role in Europe is concerned, and there are others, such as the development of a relationship with Central and Eastern European countries, including the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS], which is still in a state of flux, and which has, thus far, been the province of the NATO Cooperation Council. Consideration must also be given to developments within the CSCE, and to efforts to transform a series of conferences into an organization with duties as yet not described in full detail. All this changes Europe as it is perceived by its Canadian ally, and it forms the political backdrop for a military withdrawal beyond the Atlantic.

That is reflected in the decision to hold one of the three remaining brigades and two of the four remaining Air Force squadrons ready for worldwide deployment from the standpoint of their equipment and training. Canada has not decided thus far, however, to pledge these units so fully to NATO that they could become inextricably involved in the alliance's potential plans. By doing so, Canada is withdrawing from neither the political alliance, nor from its military organization. Canada thus continues its membership in these organizations, but in material terms, its involvement is merely symbolic, paying \$231 million to finance the NATO infrastructure, and by making a battalion available to NATO. This battalion may, depending upon NATO staffing needs, be deployed within the context of the "Allied Command Europe Mobile Force" or the "Composite Force." Involvement in the AWACS unit is an additional duty, in addition to making the Goose Bay Low Altitude Flight Training Center available to several NATO partners, as well as the Shilo Training Center, where the German Army trains its armor and armored artillery units in precision gunnery.

In other respects, Canada remains ready, as always, to support NATO, to work alongside the United States as a "European power" within the CSCE, and to contribute to the political stability of Europe. Its military withdrawal from Germany, however, and the end of its previous role do show what has changed within NATO. The process clearly demonstrates that what the alliance is lacking is the ability to define its role so concrete a

manner that such a loyal alliance partner as Canada could be given a new role within it.

Bundeswehr To Dismantle Weapons Systems

*LD0205102192 Hamburg DPA in German
0900 GMT 2 May 92*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The Bundeswehr will begin dismantling and destroying around 10,000 weapons systems by the middle of the year, according to Defense Minister Volker Ruehe [Christian Democratic Union]. Speaking on Bayerischer Rundfunk today, Ruehe explained that the Bundeswehr thereby intends unilaterally to fulfill the conditions of the Vienna treaty on conventional disarmament in Europe, which has not yet been implemented by all the members of the CIS. "Implementation of the treaty is necessary in order to be able to make progress with further disarmament treaties," he said. Heavy military systems such as tanks and artillery pieces are being scrapped, he said. Ruehe called on the members of the CIS to quickly ratify the disarmament treaty.

Turning to the heated debate concerning the European fighter aircraft, Ruehe announced that he will present the coalition parliamentary groups with the alternatives for a decision in June. "I want to leave no doubt that the Luftwaffe needs a fighter aircraft by the end of this decade, because the old machines will then have to be taken out of service," he said. But Ruehe issued a clear rejection of the Soviet MiG-29 model taken over from the former National People's Army. Even now there are increasing difficulties in maintaining the aircraft and in obtaining spare parts. "I believe that because of this problem alone, the aircraft, which is undoubtedly a good one, will probably not be the decisive alternative to the Eurofighter. But naturally that too will be examined very carefully," Ruehe said.

Concerning the forthcoming deployment of Bundeswehr medical personnel on behalf of the United Nations in Cambodia, Ruehe emphasized that the agreement between the parties on the defense committee over this issue gave a particularly positive signal of broad support by parliament to the soldiers who are serving in difficult conditions. He underscored his concern for agreement with the Social Democrats over the fundamental principles of defense policy. He is not just seeking agreement over military service for twelve months and on troop levels of 370,000 but also over participation in UN Blue Helmet missions, he said. The best road to the common goal will still have to be discussed, he added. An agreement with the Social Democratic Party over peacekeeping Blue Helmet missions should now be reached quickly, he said.

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